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The Bottom Line Concept Under Title VII: Connecticut v. Teal' —
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 to prohibit the use of certain employment tests. These are tests
having a discriminatory, or "disparate impact" on members of groups pro-
tected under the statute, while bearing no manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question. 3 To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation under this "disparate impact" theory, a plaintiff must show the admin-
istration of a facially neutral employment practice, such as a written aptitude
test, resulted in a significant adverse impact upon a protected class. 4 If such a
prima facie case is established, the employer may refute the plaintiff's case by
demonstrating that the challenged employment practice is in fact job related. 3
Since the development of the disparate impact method of Title VII
analysis, disputes have arisen surrounding the stage in the employment selec-
tion process at which disparate impact upon a statutorily protected group
should be measured. A majority of federal courts addressing the issue has re-
quired that plaintiffs seeking to make out a prima facie case demonstrate the
alleged disparate impact of a selection procedure is found in the final pool of
candidates for hire or promotion. 6 This approach of focusing on the overall
results of a selection procedure is known as the "bottom line" analysis.' Other
' 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982). 457 U.S. 440.
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1964).
3 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
* Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 42-58.
See, e.g., Criggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
6 See, e.g., Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on rehearing, 694 F.2d
876, rev'd en bane 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d
Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger,
588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Rule v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977),
vacated, Hameed v. Ironworkers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Troyan, 520
F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, Smith v. Troyan, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Ramirez v. City of
Omaha, 538 F. Supp. 7 (D. Neb. 1981) aff'd, 678 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1981); Cormier v. PPG
Indus. Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. La. 1981); Williams v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 483
F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1979) rev'd without op., Williams v. San Francisco, 685 F.2d 450 (9th
Cir. 1982); Stewart v. Hannon, 469 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. III. 1979) aff'd, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.
1981); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1978); Brown v. New Haven Civil
Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979); Jackson v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n,
424 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
7 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 1191 (1976
& Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN].
In "bottom line" cases, courts are confronted with an individual claiming to have suf-
fered unintentional discrimination caused by the disproportionate impact of a facially neutral
employment standard. Such discrimination is alleged to have occurred even though the plaintiff's
protected group as a whole has suffered no adverse effects from the overall selection procedure.
Id. at 143. Faced with this situation, deciding whether to adopt the bottom line approach depends
upon how the purpose of Title VII as well as the goals of equal employment opportunity law. Id.
at 1193. Proponents of the bottom line concept claim its adoption reflects the proper intent of
Congress to increase the employment opportunities for certain groups in the economy. See
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L. J. 1, 6
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen). Critics of the bottom line theory argue that evidence
showing a protected group as a whole has not been subject to employment discrimination does
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courts have sustained Title VII challenges to discriminatory components of an
employer's selection procedure even though the final pool of candidates reflects
a nondiscriminatory racial balance. 8
 These courts focus on the disparate im-
pact of the particular test and have found a violation of Title VII at the testing
stage, rather than in the final pool of applicants. 9
In Connecticut v. Teal," the United States Supreme Court resolved this split
among the circuits. The Court ruled that an individual may establish a prima
facie case under Title VII by producing evidence that one component of a
selection procedure — a component which operated to bar that individual from
further consideration for promotion — had a discriminatory disparate impact
on the individual's protected group." The Court allowed the establishment of
a prima facie case despite the fact that the overall results of the selection proc-
ess, or bottom line, reflected an "appropriate racial balance." 12 By rejecting
the "bottom line" approach, the Court correctly applied Title VII, arriving at
not offset the injury suffered by a specific individual under Title VII who has been denied an
employment opportunity because of a discriminatory employment criterion. See Brief of
Respondent at 13, Connecticut v. Teat, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), reprinted in BNA's LAW
REPRINTS, 15 Labor Law Series, No. 20 (1981/82) [hereinafter cited as BNA's LAW REPRINTS].
See also Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L. F.
69, 80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lopatka]; Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment
Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L. J. 121, 156-57 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Booth & Mackay]; Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines: Administering a
Polycentric Problem, 33 An. L. REV 232, 333-35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, The Bottom
Line]. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Teal, a fundamental difference of opinion existed
over whether Title VII mandates the elimination of every instance of unfair treatment of pro-
tected individuals, or the more general goal of reallocating jobs in society among certain pro-
tected groups. B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra, at 1193.
In Connecticut v. Teal, cert. granted, 454 U.S. 813 (1981), the Supreme Court undertook
to determine whether Title VII prohibits discrimination in component parts of a selection proc-
ess, even when the overall results of the process are not discriminatory. The issue framed for the
Supreme Court on Petition for Certiorari in Teal was:
"In a Title VII action in which the final outcome of the employee selection process
does not result in an adverse impact against plaintiffs minority group, can the
plaintiffs make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination by merely
establishing: (1) that they failed to succeed on one component of the selection proc-
ess and thereby became ineligible to proceed further in the selection process and (2)
that the results of such component had a disparate impact on plaintiff's minority
group?" 50 U.S.L.W. 3054 (1981).
B For instance, a test may serve to preclude a large number of applicants from a pro-
tected class, but nonetheless a large enough number of remaining applicants are hired to defeat
any allegation of disparate impact in the final result. See, e.g., Teal v. State of Connecticut, 645
F.2d 133 (2nd Cir. 1981), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev 'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo.
1981); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Santa Ana,•410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
Id.
102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
" Id. at 2529.
" Id.
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a result consistent with the congressional purpose to protect rights of all in-
dividuals to equal employment opportunities."
The plaintiffs in Connecticut v. Teal were four black employees of the
Department of Income Maintenance for the State of Connecticut.' 4 Each had
been promoted provisionally to the position of welfare eligibility supervisor.' 5
To obtain permanent status as supervisors, the plaintiffs were required to par-
ticipate in a promotion selection process. The first step in the process was a
written aptitude test." It was necessary for an applicant to obtain the requisite
passing score on the written test to advance in the selection procedure. " Those
applicants passing the test were entitled to a personal interview and a review of
their past employment record. After completion of these steps, the applicants
were placed on an eligibility list from which the employer selected its super-
visors. 18
The written test was administered to 329 candidates of whom 259 were
white and 48 were black." 54.17% of the black applicants achieved a passing
score on the test, while 79.54% of the white aspirants passed the exam. 2° The
passing rate for blacks was therefore 68% of the passing rate for white can-
didates." Plaintiffs were among those black applicants failing the test. Because
the candidates failing the test were deprived of the opportunity to be further
considered for promotion, plaintiffs challenged the written exam under Title
VII. 22
 Plaintiffs attacked the test through the disparate impact theory since the
test results showed blacks passed at a significantly lower rate than whites."
After the plaintiffs initiated their action, the supervisor selection process
continued. The results of the entire process showed that 22.9% of the original
48 black applicants were eventually promoted to supervisor, while 13.5% of
the original white applicants received promotions. 24 The bottom line,
" See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
" 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 (1982).
1 ' Id.
' 5
 Id.
' Id.
" Id.
" Id.
2° Id.
21 Id.
22 The Court scrutinized the plaintiffs' cause of action in Teal under 703(a)(2) of Title
VII. Id. at 2530. That section provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive, or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 as amended, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(2).
23 Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529.
24 Id. at 2530. 46 persons were promoted to permanent supervisory positions, 11 of
whom were black and 35 of whom were white. Id.
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therefore, was that blacks fared better as a class in the overall selection process
than did whites. The employer accordingly argued in response to the plaintiffs'
Title VII challenge that since blacks were promoted at a higher rate than
whites, blacks suffered no disparate or adverse impact from the selection
process."
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case
of employment discrimination based upon the discriminatory impact of the test
component, despite the presence of the nondiscriminatory bottom line." The
Court viewed the test component as a discriminatory — barrier" to individual
employment opportunities which could not be offset by the favorable treatment
of blacks as a group."
This casenote will examine the development, adoption, and rejection of
the bottom line concept in employment discrimination law. First, the disparate
treatment and especially the disparate impact methods of analysis under Title
VII will be considered." This discussion will provide a theoretical framework
for understanding the operation of the bottom line concept. In Section II, the
casenote will consider the bottom line concept itself," including a discussion of
the theory's development. Specifically, the adoption of the bottom line concept
by four key federal agencies in federal guidelines governing employee selection
procedures will be observed, as well as the acceptance and rejection of the bot-
tom line theory in some federal courts. Then, Section III discusses the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Connecticut u. Teal. '° This section ex-
amines the majority opinion, focusing on the rationale given by the Court for
its decision. It concludes with a discussion of the Teal dissent and an analysis of
the two positions. In Section IV, the effect of the Teal decision on procedures
for the selection of employees is examined. 3 ' It is submitted that the Supreme
Court decided this case correctly. Unfortunately, however, the Court's silence
on the scope of its decisions could result in the skillful circumvention of the Teal
opinion by employers.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER TITLE VII
A plaintiff may establish an employer's liability for employment discrimi-
nation by satisfying the disparate treatment and disparate impact standards of
Title VII review." Both theories, therefore, need to be appreciated before
discussing the bottom line theory. This section first will discuss these methods
25 Id
26 Id. at 2536.
27 Id. at 2533.
" See infra notes 33-108 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 109-219 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 220-388 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 389-444 and accompanying text.
32 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1. In addition to these two theories,
Title VII actions may be brought under two other recognized approaches. Id. One theory alleges
the defendant employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of policies which perpetuate in the
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of Title VII analysis, and then focus specifically on the methods of proof used
to implement the disparate impact theory.
A. Disparate Treatment
The disparate treatment method of Title VII analysis addresses a literal
form of discrimination, namely, treating people differently in the employment
context because of their race or other distinguishing characteristic." Disparate
treatment is thus a method by which an individual may claim he was the victim
of intentional employment discrimination if he was rejected for a position
despite his qualifications for the job. 34
 The crucial factual burden borne by a
plaintiff in such actions is proving the employer's discriminatory intent." In
McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 36
 the Supreme Court articulated an order of
proof for cases where an individual alleges that an employer has engaged in in-
tentional disparate treatment." According to the Court, establishing a prima
facie case under the disparate treatment theory requires a plaintiff to satisfy
four elements." If a plaintiff successfully fulfills the requirements for a prima
facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden then shifts to the de-
fendant employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
plaintiff's rejection. 39
 Even if an employer articulates such a reason, however,
present the past effects of discrimination. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The other approach under Title VII claims the employer failed to
make reasonable accommodation to an employee's religious observance or practices. See, e.g. ,
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardinson, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). See also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 185. The discussion in this casenote will be confined to the two
predominant theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact.
" See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1153-54. See also Friedman,
The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
3+ See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1153-54.
's Id. at 15-16, 1153-54.
36
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
" Id. at 802.
38 Id. at 794. When an individual alleges intentional discrimination under Title VII,
the plaintiff must show:
i) that he belongs to a racial minority
ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants
iii) that despite his qualifications he was rejected
iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualification.
39 Id. at 802. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
the Supreme Court elaborated on the extent of the employer's burden. While the plaintiff must
establish his prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court
emphasized in Burdine that the defendant's burden to rebut is only one of production. Id. at 255.
The defendant need only present "a legitimate reason" for his actions. Id. See also Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978) (per curiam) ("we think
that there is a significant distinction between merely articulating some nondiscriminatory reason
and proving absence of discriminatory motive ... the former will suffice to meet the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination.").
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a plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to rebut the employer's defense by show-
ing that the reason stated by the employer for rejecting the plaintiff was in fact
a pretext to mask a discriminatory motive." When a plaintiff prevails under
the McDonnell Douglas test, an employer is found liable under Title VII."
B. Disparate Impact
Unlike the disparate treatment theory, which addresses intentional em-
ployment discrimination, the disparate impact method of Title VII analysis is
used by plaintiffs who assert that a facially neutral employment practice, such
as a written test, results in a disproportionately poor success rate for members
of a statutorily protected group as compared with that of the majority group.+ 2
As an individual member of the protected group, a plaintiff may challenge the
legality of the particular employment practice under Title VII once the adverse
or disparate effect upon the plaintiff's group is established.'" Under the
disparate impact theory, therefore, an employer may not use an objective em-
ployee selection criterion that results in an adverse impact on a statutorily pro-
tected group unless the employer can prove the criterion is job related."
Disparate impact focuses on the consequences of employment practices,
not the motivation of the employer. The Supreme Court made this clear when
it broadened the scope of Title VII by developing the disparate impact theory
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." The Griggs Court ruled Title VII not only pro-
hibited intentional employment discrimination, but also employment practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
The plaintiffs in Griggs, a group of black employees of the Duke Power
Company, challenged under Title VII a policy for transfers within the com-
pany.*' The policy required employees wishing to be assigned to departments
40
 411 U.S. 792, 804.
4E See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 16.
42 See Booth & Mackay, supra note 7, at 141.
" See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV 59, 89-90 (1972) [hereinafter cited Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise].
44 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 132.
45 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In the opinion of two commentators, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is
the most important court decision in employment discrimination law." B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 5.
46 ) 401 U.S. 424, 431. Griggs involved a high school diploma and written aptitude test
requirement. In addition to test and diploma requirements, other examples of employment prac-
tices that are "fair in form" and objectively applied appear in: Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977) (minimum height and weight requirements for applicants); Green v. Missouri & Pac.
R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977); Gregory v. Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing to employ applicants with arrest or
conviction records); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(refusing to hire because of a record of wage garnishment). See generally, B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra . note 7, at 1 n.3, Friedman, supra note 33, at 11 n.58; Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 571 (1977).
4 ' 401 U.S. 424, 426-27.
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other than the unskilled "Labor Department" to possess a high school diploma
and pass two written aptitude tests." Both requirements were satisfied by
white employees at a much greater rate than blacks." One administration of
the written tests produced a 58% pass rate for whites and a +5% pass rate for
blacks. 5° The diploma and test requirements, therefore, effectively constituted
a barrier preventing disproportionate numbers of black employees from
advancing within the company. 5 '
The Supreme Court ruled that the adverse impact of the test and diploma
requirements upon black employees rendered the policy discriminatory under
Title VII." Specifically, the Court held that objective practices, procedures,
and tests neutral on their face, but also neutral in terms of their intent may not
act as barriers to employment opportunities if their effect is discriminatory. 53
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under disparate impact
theory, therefore, a plaintiff need only present evidence that a facially neutral
employment practice, such as a written test, had a significant adverse impact
on the plaintiff's statutorily protected group." If this prima facie burden is
satisfied, an employer may rebut the plaintiff's case by demonstrating the
challenged employment practice had a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question." For example, in an employment testing case the burden of
showing a manifest relationship, or job relatedness, is accomplished through
test validation. 56 In addition, however, if an employer produces evidence show-
48 Id. at 427-28.
46 Id. at 430. The Supreme Court noted that census figures for the State of North
Carolina showed 34% of the white males in the state had completed high school, while only 12%
of the black males in the state had finished high school. Id. at n.6.
50 Id.
." Id. at 431. Because the two employment requirements worked to disproportionately
freeze black employees in the unskilled Labor Department at the company, the plaintiffs brought
their Title VII actions under 703(a)(2). Id. at 426 n.l. For the text of this statutory provision, see
supra note 22.
52 401 U.S. 424, 431.
" Id. at 430-31_ Under the disparate impact theory articulated in Griggs, and especially
in cases involving employment testing where discriminatory intent is either absent or difficult to
discern, a plaintiff need not demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of the employer in
order to prevail. Id. at 432. "But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices not simply the motivation." Id. (emphasis the Court's).
' 4 Id. at 431-32. See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1159-60; Wilson, A
Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of
Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 847 (1972); Friedman, supra note 33, at 12.
" Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
36
 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426-36 (1975), the Supreme Court
elaborated on the extent of the employer's burden of test validation. The Court encouraged the
use of the EEOC Guidelines that were based upon standards of test validation developed by the
American Psychological Association. Id. at 430-31. At present, 5 5 of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures incorporates these same standards and governs test validation.
29 C.F.R. 5 1607.5 (1982). The purpose of validation is to prove through scientific analysis that
the test in question is actually an indicator of how well an applicant will perform in a particular
position. See generally, Booth & Mackay, supra note 7, at 159-89; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN su-
pra note 7 at 66-126; Rowe & Rowe, Employment Testing and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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ing a test or other selection criterion is job related, the Supreme Court ruled in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody," that a plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating
that other tests or selection devices without a similarly undesirable racial im-
pact would serve the employer's legitimate business interests. 58
C. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Compared
Disparate treatment and disparate impact are two distinct methods of
Title VII analysis. The presence of a few crucial factors in an employment
discrimination claim may be used to determine which is the appropriate
method to apply. Basically, the applicability of either theory will depend on
whether a statutorily protected group, or single individual is alleged to have
suffered discrimination, whether intentional discrimination is asserted, and
whether statistical evidence is used as the predominant grounds for the Title
VII claim.
First, the plaintiff in a disparate treatment action alleges that he was a vic-
tim of discrimination intentionally directed at him by an employer." In con-
trast, a plaintiff bringing a disparate impact action must premise his claim on
the fact that the protected group to which he belongs suffered discrimination
from a particular employment practice. It is only as a result of the adverse im-
pact suffered by the group,,that the individual member of the group derives his
right to relief under Title VII. 50 Second, the most salient difference between
disparate treatment and disparate impact is the factor of discriminatory intent.
In a disparate treatment action, a plaintiff's satisfaction of the four components
of a prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas6 ' is tantamount to an allega-
tion that intentional discrimination has been practiced by the employer against
the plaintiff. 62 In contrast, disparate impact focuses on "procedures and
1964: After Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 38 ALA. LAW 357 (1977); Barrett, Is the Test Content-
Valid: Or Who Killed Cock Robin?, 6 EMP. REL. L. J. 584 (1981); Barrett, Is the Test Content-Valid:
Or Does It Really Measure a Construct?, 6 EMP. REL. L. J. 459 (1981).
57
 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
59 Id. at 425. This third stage in the disparate impact order of proof is analogous to the
plaintiff's opportunity to show under the disparate treatment theory that the employer's stated
reason for rejecting him is a pretext for discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 40. At
this stage in the disparate impact order of proof, the plaintiff must not only show that a suitable
alternative procedure, with a less severe impact is available, but also that the employer was aware
of its existence. Therefore, the plaintiff must show that the selection procedure used by the
employer was a pretext for intentional discrimination. See generally, New York Transit Auth v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). See also Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title
VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictioe Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1981); Fur-
nish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 422 (1982); Friedman, supra note
33, at 14.
59 See Friedman, supra note 33, at 13-14. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1192. See also supra note 54 and accompa-
nying text.
61 See supra note 38.
62 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). See also Furnish, supra
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mechanisms" which operate as "built in headwinds for minority groups. " 6 S
Proof of discriminatory intent is not required when a plaintiff challenges a
facially neutral employment practice which results in an adverse impact upon a
protected group." Employment practices such as written tests, however neu-
tral they may be on their face, are unlawful under Title VII if they operate to
exclude a disproportionately large number of individuals belonging to a pro-
tected group and who are capable of performing effectively in the desired po-
sitions. 65
Finally, the propriety of using statistical evidence in setting out a prima
facie case differs under the disparate treatment and disparate impact methods
of analysis. In a disparate impact action, a dispute over whether a challenged
employment practice did in fact have an adverse impact upon the plaintiff's
protected group will center on statistical analysis." A comparison of statistical
evidence derived from the rates at which protected group members and majori-
ty group members satisfy a particular employment requirement is a sufficient
basis for the establishment of a prima facie case under disparate impact. 67 Fur-
thermore, a defendant employer may produce his own statistics to refute the
existence of a disparate impact and, accordingly, the prima facie case."
In contrast, statistical evidence is not dispositive in a disparate treatment
action. A successful action under disparate treatment depends on the plaintiff's
satisfaction of the elements set forth in McDonnell Douglas." If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the defendant bears the burden of articulating a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiffs' rejection." This
burden, however, may not be entirely satisfied by the production of statistical
evidence which shows the plaintiff's group, or other protected groups are well
represented in the employer's workforce." The critical factor in disparate
note 58, at 422.
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 53.
64 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Noi:e, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Fade
Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, supra note 58, at 187-88.
65 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66 See B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1161-63. See also Shoben, Differential
Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV 793,
794-95 (1978).
67 Booth & Mackay, supra note 7, at 142. See also discussion infra note 87 and accompa-
nying text.
" See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
" See Shoben, supra note 66, at 794 n.8. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
7 ' In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the plaintiffs established a
prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate treatment theory. Id. at 575. The employer
offered statistical evidence that his workforce reflected a non-discriminatory racial balance. Id. at
579. The Supreme Court ruled that these statistics were not totally irrelevant when the issue of
whether the employer has acted with a discriminatory motive is to be determined. We cannot
say that such proof would have absolutely no probative value in determining whether the other-
wise unexplained rejection of minority applicants was discriminatorily motivated." Id. at 580,
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treatment analysis is the employer's intent. While statistical data may be
useful, 72 it is not enough by itself to sufficiently rebut a prima facie case under
the disparate treatment theory."
D. Proving Disparate Impact
Unlike disparate treatment cases 74 where statistical evidence does not pro-
vide the dispositive basis for a Title VII claim," in disparate impact actions,
statistics may be employed in a variety of ways to both prove and disprove the
discriminatory effect of an employer's objective selection criterion." Employ-
ment tests are one example of an objective selection criterion used by employ-
ers. After Griggs v. Duke Power Co." and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody", it is clear
that tests may not be used by employers without a business justification, if they
result in an adverse impact on a statutorily protected group." In a disparate
impact action under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case by proving the test in question had a substantial disparate im-
pact on a protected class. 8° At this stage, the defendant employer is also af-
forded an opportunity to produce evidence showing no disparate impact has
occurred, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case." Disparate impact
litigation consequently is focused on the prima facie stage of the order of proof 82
where courts must decide whether the plaintiffs' protected group has suffered
an adverse impact, or whether the employer has sufficiently rebutted the plain-
The Court cautioned, however, that these statistics are not enough to rebut a prima facie case
alone because "a racially balanced workforce cannot immunize an employer from liability for
specific acts of discrimination." Id. at 579.
72 The Supreme Court has ruled that evidence of a racially balanced workforce for ex-
ample, may be considered when the employer's motivation is to be determined. See supra note 71.
" Id.
74 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
75 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971) discussed supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
" 422 U.S. 405 (1975) discussed supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying notes 49-58. If a test has a disproportionate impact on a
protected group and is proven to be job related, nothing prevents the employer from selecting
employees according to the results of the test. This employer right is explicitly guaranteed in Title
VII. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer . . . to give and act upon the results of any profes-
sionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
78 Stat. 257, as amended 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h).
°° See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 73. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
al See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1160.
as Id. at 1161. In Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), discussed infra notes
258-353 and accompanying text, the issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case. See also supra note 7.
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tiff's claim of disparate impact. 83
 The evidence proffered by both parties at this
stage in the disparate impact order of proof often consists of statistical evidence.
Courts have recognized three forms of statistical evidence introduced by
plaintiffs as sufficient methods of proving a significant disparate impact has oc-
curred." The first method of proof analyzes the effect of the challenged em-
ployment requirement in the context of the general population. This approach
compares the percentage of minorities or women in the general population ex-
cluded by an employment requirement with the percentage of whites or males
similarly excluded." If a requirement excludes a disproportionate number of
protected group members, a prima facie case of discrimination may be
established." A second statistical method is to compare the pass-fail rates of the
actual applicants for hire or promotion under the challenged employment re-
quirement. In cases involving employment testing, a comparison is made of the
percentage of the protected group members failing a particular test, with the
number of whites or males failing the same test." If, for example, whites pass a
test at a significantly higher rate than blacks, this may be sufficient for the
establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination." The third method of
statistical proof involves a plaintiff presenting a comparison of the racial, or
sexual composition of the employer's workforce with the racial or sexual com-
position of the local geographical area from which the employer hires person-
" See M. MINER &J. MINER, EMPLOYEE SELECTION WITHIN THE LAW, 22-23 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as M. MINER & J. MINER]. See also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise, supra note
43, at 91.
84 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1162; Lopatka, supra note 7, at 76; see
also Smith and Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L.
REV. 33, 46 n.54 (1981).
85 Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Im-
pact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shoben, Probing].
The Supreme Court applied this type of analysis in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 n.6 (1971), by comparing the census figures for white males and black males in the State of
North Carolina possessing high school diplomas. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
88 See Shoben, Probing, supra note 85 at 6.
87 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1162 n.66. See also Booth & Mackay,
supra note 7, at 143-46; Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 7; Shoben, supra note 66, at 796. The
question of how substantial the disparity is in the pass-fail rate for majority groups when com-
pared to statutorily protected groups has been subject to mixed opinion. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1184-88,
In Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1171-73 (2d Cir. 1972), the passing
rate for the majority group compared to the protected group which equaled the ratio of 1.5: 1.0
was held to constitute substantial disparate impact. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures, discussed infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text, recommend a 4/5 rule of
thumb for determining disparate impact, The 4/5 rule could also be expressed as the ratio 1.25:
1.0 or 80%. According to this rule, if the selection rate for a protected group is less than 80% the
selection rate for the majority group under the challenged employment procedure, the Guidelines
suggest disparate impact has occurred. 29 C. F R $ 1607.4D. Se? Booth & Mackay, supra note 7,
at 151-55 for a discussion of the Uniform Guidelines.
88 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1162-63.
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ne1. 89 The plaintiff may create an inference of discrimination by showing that
there is a significant disparity between these two percentages. 9°
A defendant employer has an opportunity to produce statistical proof of
his own to rebut plaintiff's assertion of a prima facie case." One form of such
statistical proof is applicant flow data. 92 Applicant flow data reflects a com-
parison of the minority or sexual composition of the applicant group with the
sexual or racial composition of the group of applicants the employer eventually
decides to hire or promote." The Supreme Court addressed the role of appli-
cant flow statistics in Dothard v. Rawlinson. 94 In that case, a female plaintiff chal-
lenged the State of Alabama's policy of requiring its correctional officers to
meet minimum height and weight requirements set by statute." The plaintiff
failed to satisfy the minimum requirement and was denied a position as a cor-
rectional officer. The plaintiff produced evidence showing the combination
height and weight requirements excluded 41 % of the female population, but
less than 1 % of the males." The Supreme Court rejected an argument by the
defendant state employer that the plaintiff was required to produce applicant
flow data to establish a prima facie case." The Court, however, did not totally
89 Shoben, Probing, supra note 85 at 9. See also B. SCHLEf & P. GROSSMAN supra note 7 at
1170-81.
In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977), the Supreme
Court narrowed the local population comparison when the job in question demands certain
qualifications. In that case,' the position was a schoolteacher. Because schoolteachers require
special training and licensing, the Court recommended a "qualified labor market" be used in a
comparison to determine whether disparate impact had occurred. Id. at 308 n.13. The qualified
labor market consists of all those persons in the local community who are actually qualified to
perform the job in question. Id. See Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 9-19.
In cases where the position in question does not necessarily require specialized training
or qualifications, courts have used the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), a
geographical area defined by the Office of Management and Budget for the purpose of local
population statistical comparisons. See generally, Gwartney, Asher, Haworth and Howarth,
Statistics, the Law and Title VII: An Economist's View, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633 (1979); Braun,
Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 59,
64 (1980).
'" See Booth & Mackay, supra note 7, at 148. See also Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 8.
In both Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977), and International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) the Supreme Court held
that there must be a "gross disparity" shown to exist between the composition of the employer's
workforce and the population composition of the surrounding community area from which the
employer hires in order for a prima facie case of discrimination to be based on this comparison
alone. In Hazelwood, the Court also stated that applicant flow statistics offered by the employer
could rebut a prima facie case based on a workforce-local community population disparity. 433
U.S. at 308 n.13.
91 Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 19.
92 Id. at 21. See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1165-67.
" Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 22.
94 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
95 Id. at 324. The statute set minimum physical qualifications for all law enforcement
officers, including correctional officers. The law required all applicants to meet a 120 lb.
minimum weight requirement and a 5 foot-2 inch minimum height standard. Id. at 323-24 n.2.
96 Id. at 329-30.
97 Id. at 330. The applicant flow statistics requested by the employer would show a
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dismiss the relevance of applicant flow data. The Court stated an employer was
free to offer such statistical evidence of his own, if he discerns fallacies or de-
ficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff. 98
Applicant flow statistics can be a very reliable tool for a defendant
employer. 99
 By using applicant flow statistics, an employer could demonstrate
that his selection requirements do not result in a disparate impact if the
percentage of minorities or women job applicants accepted for position was
higher than the percentage of whites or men ultimately hired)" Consequently,
even if there were a substantial disparity between the composition of these pro-
tected groups in the employer's work force, and their representation in the gen-
eral population, the employer could demonstrate no disparate impact has oc-
curred with applicant flow statistics.'°' Applicant flow data has been adopted
by various courts as an accurate indicator of the presence or absence of
disparate impact. 102
comparison of those women who applied for corrections jobs with the number of women actually
hired. The Supreme Court rejected the employer's demand, reasoning that the numbers would
be skewed due to "applicant self selection." Id. Self-selection refers to the fact that the actual
pool of applicants for jobs would not accurately reflect the maximum potential applicants because
those women who were aware of the minimum height and weight requirements would not bother
to apply for a job since they knew they would be eliminated by the physical standards. Id. See
Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 22. Self selection illustrates the primary means by which a
plaintiff may refute the applicant flow statistics proffered by defendant employer. The plaintiff
should argue that discrimination tainted the formation of the applicant pool either through self
selection or another discriminatory requirement. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at
1167. See also Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 22-23.
99
 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). In Hazelwood School Dist. v,
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977), the Supreme Court instructed the district court,
on remand, to consider the applicant flow data offered by the employer in rebuttal of the
plaintiff's prima facie case as "very relevant."
99 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1166-67.
'°° See Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII: In Reply to Dr. Cohn,
55 IND. L. J. 515, 530-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Shoben, In Defense]. See also supra notes
91-98 and accompanying text.
1 °' See, e.g. , Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 473 F.2d 318, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1973). The plain-
tiff challenged the company's hiring policies under Title VII as discriminatory towards Mexican-
Americans. Mexican-Americans comprised about 10% of the surrounding community popula-
tion. Out of 684 applicants for employment during the year in question, 11 were Mexican-
Americans, 20 were black, and 653 were Anglo (white). Id at 320. The employer hired 56 persons
during that year and only one was a Mexican-American. Despite the apparent disparity, the
court recognized applicant flow statistics offered by the employer which showed 9.09% of all
Mexican-American applicants were hired, while only 8.17% of all other groups were hired.
Because of the favorable applicant flow data, the court ruled no discrimination had occurred. Id.
1 °' See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1165 n.84. See also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, (Supp. 1979) 320 n.66.
In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977) in which
the Supreme Court allowed the use of applicant flow statistics, the Court approvingly cited
Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379-81 (5th Cir. 1974). In that case, the appeals
court stated "The most direct route to proof of racial discrimination in hiring, is proof of a
disparity between the percentage of blacks among those applying for a particular position, and
the percentage of blacks among those hired for a particular position." Id. at 1379. See generally,
Hay, The Use of Statistics to Disprove Employment Discrimination, 29 LAB. L. J. 430 (1978).
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In summary, there are two basic theories of Title VII analysis. The
disparate treatment theory is employed by individual plaintiffs who have suf-
fered intentional discrimination directed personally at them. 1 °3 Disparate im-
pact is used by plaintiffs to challenge a facially neutral employment practice
which has an adverse effect on a statutorily protected group.'" As a member of
that group, the plaintiff is entitled to challenge the legality of the employment
practice under Title VII. In cases involving employment testing, courts have
employed disparate impact analysis.'°° In all disparate impact cases, including
testing cases, statistical evidence plays a critical role.'" Various methods of
statistical analysis are used by plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case under
disparate impact.'" Applicant flow data is an example of statistical evidence
which may be introduced by a defendant employer to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case.m° Using this discussion of standards of review under Title
VII and the methods of proof as a theoretical background, the next section of
this casenote will examine the emergence of the "bottom line" concept in em-
ployment discrimination cases.
II. THE BOTTOM LINE CONCEPT
The popularity of applicant flow statistics in disparate impact cases pro-
vided a foundation on which to build the bottom line concept. 109 Courts de-
cided that when determining whether a protected group has suffered a
disproportionate impact from a selection process, the most reliable indicator
was a comparison between the percentage of the plaintiff's class among the ap-
plicants for the job, and the percentage of plaintiff's class among persons ac-
tually hired or promoted."° The acceptance of applicant flow data shifted a
court's focus from inquiring whether members of a protected group are suffer-
ing discriminatory impact from a selection requirement, to whether a sufficient
number of protected group members were among those ultimately selected."'
Applicant flow data thus tended to supplant general population statistics, pass-
fail comparisons, and local community or relevant labor market and workforce
comparisons as the method of determining whether a substantial disparate im-
pact had occurred." 2
101 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
' 1:° See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
' 06 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
109 In New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979), the Supreme Court
further encouraged the use of applicant flow statistics when it refused to allow the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case on the basis of population statistics. In a footnote, the Court implied
applicant statistics would be more significant proof of discrimination. Id. at 587 n.29. See Freid-
man, supra note 33, at 48-52. See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1191, and
(Supp. 1979) supra note 7, at 320-21.
110 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
"' See supra noes 91-101 and accompanying text.
1 ' 2 See supra note 102.
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Under the bottom line concept of disproportionate impact, a violation of
Title VII is deemed not to occur when the overall results of an employer's hir-
ing or promotion scheme are not discriminatory, even if individual component
requirements of that scheme had a disparate impact on a protected group. 13
Thus the court's focus in a bottom line case is on the percentage of women or
minorities actually hired, rather than on a single criterion in the overall proc-
ess. 114 Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court on the heightened role
for applicant flow statistics embodied in the use of the bottom line theory," 5
lower courts either applied their own reasoning, or looked to the federal en-
forcement agencies for direction on the propriety of the bottom line approach to
disparate impact."6 Until the Supreme Court rejected the bottom line concept
in 1982, in Connecticut a. Teal, " 7 it had been heralded as the most important
concept in employment discrimination law since the disparate impact theory
was developed in Griggs a. Duke Power Co."e
A. The Federal Guidelines
After the Supreme Court's landmark pronouncement on disparate impact
in Griggs, " 5 Congress instructed the five government agencies responsible for
monitoring employment discrimination to draft guidelines to help coordinate
the implementation of Title VII. 120 The agencies were unable, however, to
reach unanimous agreement over such critical issues as a definition of what
constitutes disparate impact, and the validity of the bottom line theory.' 2 ' The
1 " See generally Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 4-6.
" 4 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1191. See also Lopatka, supra note 7, at
79-80.
"a The Supreme Court had recognized the utility of bottom line applicant flow statistics
in Dothard, discussed supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text, Hazelwood, discussed supra note
98, and Beazer, discussed supra note 109. There had been no case before the Court, however, in-
volving a component of a selection process with an adverse impact and a non discriminatory bot-
tom line. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), for example, the height and weight
standards had a disproportionate impact on female applicants and women were also not propor-
tionately represented at the bottom line. For a discussion of Dothard, see supra notes 94-98 and ac-
companying text.
16 For a discussion of the bottom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines, see infra notes
119-34 and accompanying text.
' 17 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
118 See, e.g. , Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 5, 20.
" 9 For a discussion of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), see supra notes
47-58 and accompanying text.
120 The Agencies involved were the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Civil
Service Commission, Civil Rights Commission, Department of Labor and Department of
Justice. They comprised the "Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council," which
was created to promote efficiency and to "eliminate conflict, competition, duplication, and in-
consistency among the federal enforcement agencies." Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 29
n. 129. Prior to the creation of the four member council, the EEOC had issued its own guidelines
on employee selection and employment testing in 1966 and 1970. See Note, The Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures: Compromises and Controversies, 28 OATH. U. L. REV. 605, 612-19
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Catholic Univ. Note].
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 329-30.
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EEOC refused to join in the publishing of the Federal Executive Agency
Guidelines in 1976.' 22 These guidelines included a definition of substantial
disparate impact known as the "4/5 rule of thumb. '123 According to the rule,
adverse impact does not occur in any selection process which chooses minority
or women candidates at 80% or more the rate that whites or men are
selected.'" The 1976 guidelines also incorporated the bottom line theory by
stating that validation of individual components in a selection process which
had a disparate impact on protected groups would not be required, if the
overall results of the process reveal no adverse impact. 225
 The EEOC instead
recommended in its own guidelines, that non-discriminatory results of an en-
tire selection procedure do not preclude an application of the disparate impact
method of Title VII analysis to each discriminatory component in the selection
process. 126
The need for uniformity among all the federal agencies led in 1978 to the
adoption of the "Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure. "127
The EEOC and other agencies reached a compromise which resulted in the in-
clusion of the bottom line concept in the new guidelines. The compromise
achieved was to have the guidelines state no government agency would initiate
proceedings under Title VII against an employer with a non-discriminatory
bottom line.'" On the one hand, this wording assured the EEOC that the right
of an individual to challenge a discriminatory component of a selection process,
even if a non-discriminatory bottom line existed, was preserved.'" On the
other hand, an employer maintaining a non-discriminatory bottom line could
122 Id, at 330. "Federal Executive Agency Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures" 41 Fed. Reg. 51734 (1976).
123 Catholic Univ. Note, supra note 120, at 628-29. For a discussion of the 4/5 rule, see
supra note 87.
124 See A. SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 925 (1978).
125 Id. See also Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 330.
126
 Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 3301. See also Shoben, Probing, supra note
85, at 28-29.
12? 29 C.F.R. $ 1607 (1978). The stated purpose of the guidelines was to " . . . Assist ...
employers to comply with federal law prohibiting employment practices that discriminate, and
provide a framework for determining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures." 29
C.F.R. 1607.1b.
125 Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 335-36. The provision states in pertinent
part:
"If ... the total selection process for a job has an adverse impact, the individual
components of the selection process should be evaluated for adverse impact „ If
the total, selection process does not have an adverse impact, the Federal enforce-
ment agencies, in the exercise of their administrative and prosecutorial discretion,
in the usual circumstances, will not expect a user to evaluate the individual com-
ponents for adverse impact, or to validate such individual components, and will not
take enforcement action based upon adverse impact of any component of that proc-
ess, including the separate parts of a multipart selection procedure or any separate
procedure that is used as an alternative method of selection."
29 C.F.R. $ 1607, 4C (1978).
129
 Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 336-37 n.40.
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expect no government initiated Title VII challenge to individual components of
his selection process.'" Thus the Uniform Guidelines speak only of the propri-
ety of government enforcement actions in bottom line cases. Since the
Guidelines are not law, they did not affect the ability of the EEOC to pursue an
individual's charges of employment discrimination."'
Unlike the preceding Federal Agency Guidelines, the Uniform Guidelines
do not represent a total acceptance of the bottom line theory.'" Under the
Federal Agency Guidelines, no disparate impact challenge would be allowed,
and no validation expected of individual selection criterion when a favorable
bottom line existed.'" The 1978 Uniform Guidelines, however, without force
of law, recommend the bottom line theory as a matter of governmental discre-
tion rather than a binding legal interpretation of Title VII.'" Hence, federal
courts were free to entertain individual claims attacking selection criterion in
bottom line cases after the promulgation of the Uniform Guidelines.
B. The Adoption of the Bottom Line by Federal Courts
The compromise eventually reached by the federal agencies on the role of
the bottom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines did not constitute an un-
qualified endorsement of the theory. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the bottom
line concept in the federal guidelines could be perceived by some federal courts
as an authoritative opinion on an issue not easily addressed by existing case
law. A pronouncement on the bottom line issue in an EEOC guideline carried
great persuasive weight since the Supreme Court stated in Griggs that the
guidelines should be accorded "great deference" in determining congres-
sional intent under Title VII.'" Thus, some lower courts were likely to em-
brace the bottom line provision in the Uniform Guidelines as more controlling
than the agencies themselves had originally anticipated."°
' 3 ° Id. See also Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 31; Catholic Univ. Note, supra note 120,
at 628.
"' Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 13, at 337 n.40. See also "Questions and
Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures," Question and Answer No. 26, 44 Fed. Reg. 12000 (1979),
reprinted in M. MINER & J. MINER, supra note 83, at 464, 473.
'" See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
'" Id. Compare 29 C.F.R. 55 1607.2-1607.3 (1975) (EEOC Guidelines) with 41 C.F.R. $
60-3.4(b) (1976) (Federal Agency Guidelines), cited in Lopatka, supra note 7, at 80 n.51.
134
 Blumrosen, The Bottom Line, supra note 7, at 335 n 32. See also Catholic Univ. Note,
supra note 156, at 628 n.166.
1 " Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). In Albemarle Paper Co. v,
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court reiterated that "the EEOC guidelines are not ad-
ministrative regulations promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by Congress.
But as this Court has heretofore noted, they do constitute the administrative interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency and consequently they are entitled to 'great deference.' " Id. at 431.
For a discussion of Albemarle, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. See also Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
"6 See, e.g. , Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial
Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, supra note 58, at 189 n.51. "The Uniform Guidelines' recent
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The inclusion of the bottom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines served
to augment the technique employed by some federal courts to analyze the end
result of a selection process through applicant flow statistics.'" The popularity
of applicant flow statistics, when coupled with what could be viewed as an en-
dorsement of the bottom line approach in the Uniform Guidelines, created a
judicial atmosphere ripe for the adoption of the bottom line theory. Without
any clear indication from the Supreme Court, lower federal courts focused on
the actual hiring rates for applicants from statutorily protected groups in
disparate impact actions and rejected Title VII challenges to isolated selection
requirements when the applicant flow statistics reflected no adverse impact.'"
The bottom line approach to a disparate impact case was adopted in Brown
v. New Haven Civil Service Board.' 39 The Brown court's rationale included.
reliance on applicant flow statistics and the bottom line provision in the Uni-
form Guidelines. In Brown, three black applicants challenged a written ex-
amination that constituted one phase of a multi-stage hiring process for the
New Haven Police Department under Title VII.H° Applicants were required
to obtain a combined passing score on both a written test and a physical agility
approval of the bottom line concept will likely have a profound effect on the effective use of appli-
cant flow statistics ... " Id.; Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 31-32; Catholic Univ. Note, supra
note 120, at 628-29. "The Uniform Guidelines' adoption of the bottom line concept and the
four-fifths rule could increase a plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion ... To present a prima facie case under the bottom line concept, plaintiffs now usually must
show that the employer's total selection process, rather than a single test adversely affects
minorities. Only then will an employer be forced to put forth proof of job relatedness." Id.
'" Applicant flow data had focused the courts' attention on the ultimate rate of selection
for members of a protected group from the original applicant pool. See, e.g. , Friend v. Leidinger,
588 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1978) ("various subtests may not be analyzed in isolation as this can
lead to inconsistencies. The best comparison is between the number of blacks and whites who in-
itially sought promotion to Fire Lieutenant, and the numbers who were actually promoted.");
Jackson v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 456 F. Supp. 879, 881 (ED, Mo. (1978)) ("The court
concludes that Plaintiff Jackson has not established a prima facie case. Although the two year col-
lege education requirement certainly has a disparate impact on the general population, defendant
has had no problem recruiting qualified blacks."); Donnell v. G. M. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 668,
672 (E.D. Mo. 1977) ("It would be illogical to 'conclude that plaintiff has established a prima
facie case ... "). See also supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
1S8
 See, e.g. , Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., 519 F. Supp. 211, 278 (W.D. La. 1981) ("In ex-
amining selection procedures which allegedly have a disparate impact, the court must first deter-
mine whether the selection procedure in its entirety has resulted in a meaningul or substantial ex-
clusion of blacks from the job opportunity in question. If there is no disparate impact in the
overall process, then there is no prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.") Ramirez
v. City of Omaha, 538 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Neb. 1981) ("But in considering the parties' statistical
proof it is important to note the firefighter selection process must first be viewed as a whole to
determine the presence of disparate impact ... "). Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756,
771 (E.D. Va. 1978) ("The crucial fact in determining disparate impact is the rate at which
blacks are ultimately chosen for the position rather than their test scores made in the process of
selection."); Jackson v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 n.11
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (" . if the final result of the examination procedure does not evidence a
discriminatory impact, cultural or racial bias in individual test items is irrelevant.").
' 39
 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979).
140 Id. at 1258.
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test to continue to be eligible for further consideration in the process.' 4 ' The
plaintiffs were among those black applicants who failed the written exam and
were therefore barred from continuing in the selection process. 142 Statistical
evidence revealed 61.9% of the white applicants passed the test, while 30.3%
of the black applicants received passing scores.'" Despite the clear disparate
impact the examination had on black applicants, applicant flow statistics show-
ed the number of blacks hired as a percentage of the original black applicants
was roughly the same as the percentage for whites.'"
The court held that ultimate results of the entire hiring procedure showed
no prima facie case of disparate impact could be established. 145 At the outset,
the district court employed the "4/5 rule of thumb'' set forth in the Uniform
Guidelines as a definition of adverse impact.'" The Brown court recognized
that this rule was not binding on courts, but nevertheless determined the Uni-
form Guidelines were an "administrative interpretation of Title VII entitled to
considerable deference." 147
 Most importantly, however, the court chose to ap-
ply the 4/5 rule to the results of the selection process as a whole, rather than to
the results of the test component.'"
Judge Newman's decision in Brown to concentrate the court's analysis on
the results of the overall selection process was based on more than applicant
flow statistics. He also buttressed his decision to confine the court's analysis to
the overall results with a judicial economy argument. 149 He felt examining in-
dividual components of a multi-stage selection process would launch the court
on a course which has "no boundaries and no clear end."'" Judge Newman
14 ' It If the applicant accumulated a combined passing score on the exam and agility
test, he or she was eligible for an interview. The interview was scored separately and selections
were made according to the rating received in the interview. An applicant failing to achieve a
passing score on the exam and agility test was disqualified from further consideration. Id.
142 Id. This type of selection process differs from a cumulative selection procedure,
discussed infra notes 204-19 and accompanying text, in which all applicants are exposed to every
component of the selection procedure and receive an aggregate rating from the total process.
'" Brown, 474 F. Supp. at 1260. Out of 99 blacks who took the written exam, 30 passed;
out of 194 whites who took the exam, 120 passed. Id.
144 Id. The most favorable construction of the results of the selection process showed that
of those applicants taking the exam, 8.0% of the blacks were hired and 9.5% of the original white
applicants were hired. Id. The defendant also produced statistical evidence which showed the
number of blacks hired (14), represented 28% of the newly hired officers. The black composition
of the City of New Haven was 26%. Id. at 1261.
146
 Id. at 1263.
146
 Id. at 1260. While the applicant flow data profferred by the employer satisfied the
80% rule for determining adverse impact included in the Uniform Guidelines, (a black hiring
rate 84% that of the white rate), the passing rate for blacks on the exam did not satisfy the 80%
rule. (30.3% of the black applicants passed the test while 61.9% of the whites passed. Thus the
black rate was less than 50% of the white rate.) Id.
147
 Id. at 1260.
148 Id. at 1260-61.
149 Id. at 1262.
15°
 Id. See also Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1975), discussed infra
notes 168-74 and accompanying text. See also Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 26-27.
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contended that even courts that decided to penetrate the application process to
examine a single pass-fail hurdle would have to draw the line at some point to
avoid scrutiny of every question found on every test in a hiring procedure. 151
He concluded, therefore, the prospect of a court examining sub-tests, sub-sub-
tests and even individual questions within the test was a legitimate argument in
favor of examining only the end result of an entire hiring process.'"
The Brown court also viewed the bottom line concept as an incentive for
employers to engage in voluntary affirmative action.'" The Brown court con-
cluded Title VII would be "needlessly construed" if used to invalidate a proc-
ess which resulted in a non-discriminatory racial proportionality. 154 As a final
justification for denying a prima facie case based on the applicant flow statistics
from the entire selection process, the Brown court referred to the inclusion of
the bottom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines.'S 5 The court noted that the
guidelines specifically pertain to the decision of government agencies and pros-
ecutors whether to allocate scarce federal resources in the pursuit of a bottom
line case.'" Nevertheless, the court inferred that the incorporation of the bot-
tom line concept indicated a "threshold of administrative concern." 157 In the
absence of any evidence of discriminatory intent, the court felt judicial concern
should be set at the same level. " 8 In other words, federal courts likewise should
adopt the bottom line approach.
Brown serves as an example of the conflicting outcomes that occur when
cases involve a discriminatory component with both a discernible dispropor-
tionate impact on a protected group, and non-discriminatory bottom line hir-
ing statistics. In Brown, the test component functioned as a pass-fail barrier
which the court termed a "hurdle."'" Those individual applicants failing the
test were disqualified and eliminated from the pool of potential policemen.
Despite the fact that the test had a disparate impact by itself on a protected
group, and functioned as a barrier, the court was not willing to afford these in-
dividuals the protection of Title VII. As long as an adequate number of black
applicants cleared the hurdle and were ultimately hired, the court placed no
'" Brown, 474 F. Supp. at 1262.
152 Id.
l" Id. at 1263. For a contrary view of the voluntary affirmative action prompted by the
bottom line concept, see Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 31-33. See also EEOC v. Greyhound
Lines Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1980) (Slovitier, C. J., dissenting) ("This rule would
establish by judicial fiat an invidious quota defense.").
134 Brown, 474 F. Supp. at 1263.
155 Id. at 1263 n.10.
"6 Id.
l" Id.
'" Id.
i" Id. at 1262. Such a requirement could also be termed a "knock out" component
because it eliminates applicants from further consideration. See Brief of the National League of
Cities and the National Public Employer Labor Relations Assoc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 26. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, (1982), reprinted in BNA's LAW
REPRINTS, supra note 7, at 288.
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burden on the employer to show the written test was in fact related to job per-
formance.'"
In summary, the reasoning employed by the Brown court included four
factors that generally facilitated the adoption of the bottom line approach to
disparate impact cases. First, courts recognized applicant flow data as the most
salient indication of whether a protected group had suffered from adverse im-
pact in a selection process.' 6 f Second, despite the fact that the Uniform
Guidelines provision on the bottom line tacitly preserved the right of in-
dividuals to challenge discriminatory components in cases with non-discrimi-
natory bottom lines, the guidelines provision could be interpreted by courts as
the official imprimatur of the EEOC and other enforcement agencies endorsing
the bottom line approach to disparate inapact.' 62
 Third, the argument for
judicial economy could be employed to dissuade courts from choosing to
penetrate individual components of a selection process. 163
 Fourth, the bottom
line theory could be seen as an incentive for employers to engage in voluntary
affirmative action.'"
Brown is an example of a court allowing favorable bottom line statistics to
absolve an employer from liability where a selection criterion with a disparate
impact eliminates members of a protected group from consideration for hiring.
In that case, the written test acted as an absolute barrier to further considera-
tion for selection. A different situation is presented by a selection procedure
where no one component functions as a pass-fail hurdle, but rather the results
of several criteria are combined to achieve a single applicant rating. The bot-
tom line theory is also applicable to this type of "cumulative selection pro-
cedure."
In a cumulative selection procedure, a passing score on an employment
test is not a prerequisite for progression to other stages of the selection process
such as physical agility tests, medical exams, or personal interviews. 165 Rather,
in such a selection procedure an applicant's score on a written test would be
considered in the aggregate with the results of other components of the entire
selection procedure.'" In this way exposure to other components may serve to
offset a lower score, or a rating received by a candidate in a specific component
of the entire selection process."'
160 Brown, 474 F. Supp. at 1263,
161 See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text. See also Teal v. Connecticut, No.
B-79-128 (D. Conn. 1980), discussed infra note 233 and accompanying text.
163 See also Brief for Petitioner at 26; Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982) reprinted
in BNA's LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7, at 206; Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners by the
Equal Employment Advisory Council and International Personnel Management Accos. Id. at 6.
164
 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. See alto discussion infra note 425.
165 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1192. See also Teal v. Connecticut,
645 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1981).
166
 See Shoben, Probing, supra note 85, at 3-4, 25-27.
167 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1192.
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Smith v. Troyan"a provides an example of a case involving such a cumula-
tive selection procedure. In Smith, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals employed
the bottom line approach to reject a plaintiff's assertion that a prima facie
violation of Title VII occurred from the use of a written test that had an
adverse effect on blacks. Smith differs from Brown in that no one component of
the selection process functioned as a pass-fail barrier which had to be surpassed
by a candidate.
The plaintiff in Smith was a black applicant for a position on the police
department of the City of East Cleveland, Ohio. 1 69
 Applicants were required to
proceed through a selection process that consisted of a written test, an athletic
test, a medical examination, and an oral interview."° These requirements
were combined to achieve an aggregate rating which was adjusted upwards if
an applicant was a veteran."' The plaintiffs challenged the written test compo-
nent claiming the test resulted in a disparate impact upon blacks.'" The Sixth
Circuit held no prima facie case of disparate impact could be established based
on favorable applicant flow statistics produced by the employer.'" In addition,
since the written exam was a subtest of a cumulative procedure, the court
determined that a disproportionately poor black performance on the written
component was not conclusive' 74 since the applicants were exposed to all the
other components of the selection procedure.
In 1975, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals"' similarly advocated the
bottom line approach and refused to fragment a cumulative selection pro-
cedure to investigate its sub-components in Kirkland v. New York State Department
of Correctional Service. 16
 The court approved of the district court's decision not to
penetrate a multi-part examination and analyze its component parts. The
court saw little relevance in an investigation of individual test components
168 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied Smith v. Troyan, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
169 520 F.2d at 493 n.1.
17° Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
17 ' Id.
172 The plaintiff "failed" the written test portion of the cumulative selection procedure
by receiving a score so low on the written exam, that it could not be offset by one or all of the
other components. Id. at 1135. The plaintiff produced the results for three years of testing that
showed that whites passed the written test component significantly more often than blacks. In the
latest administration, 71% of the white applicants passed, while only 22% of the black applicants
passed. Id.
173 Smith, 520 F.2d at 497. The applicant flow statistics for the three years of hiring that
were under Title VII challenge by the plaintiff, showed blacks comprised 33% of the applicants
and 29% of the police hired from the selection process. Id.
"4 The district court had reasoned that blacks were adversely affected by the test re-
quirement, but they were disproportionately advantaged by the veterans preference adjustment.
363 F. Supp. at 1146. (75% of the black applicants were veterans while only 36% of the white
candidates were veterans. Id.) Therefore, the circuit court drawing upon this reasoning, con-
cluded that the process should be viewed in its entirety. 520 F.2d at 497-98. See Shoben, Probing,
supra note 85, at 25-27.
"s The same court of appeals that would later decide Teal v. State of Connecticut, 645
F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed infra notes 234-57 and accompanying text.
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since a passing score and promotion was based on the cumulative results of five
subtests, and the issue was really whether the examination as a whole had a
disparate impact.'" The district court in Kirkland had vigorously insisted on an
analysis of the examination procedure in its entirety; not after it was
fragmented into its component parts.'" The district court reasoned any other
approach to the problem would "conflict with the dictates of common
sense. "179
The propriety of a bottom line approach to disparate impact claims involv-
ing individual components of cumulative selection procedures also has been
adopted by other courts.'" The application of the bottom line approach to
cases involving cumulative selection procedures, however, is distinguishable
from a case involving pass-fail hurdles."' The major difference between the
two types of procedures is that in a cumulative procedure, if a member of a pro-
tected group suffers discrimination from the disparate impact of one compo-
nent, he or she has the opportunity, at least in theory, to offset that discrimina-
tion with a superior performance on another component. Alternatively, the ap-
plicant could benefit from a component which favors his protected group. 182 In
a selection procedure where a component criterion acts as a pass-fail barrier or
"knock-out" component, the candidate suffering discrimination is afforded no
similar opportunity since he is eliminated from any further consideration.'"
Courts such as Smith and Kirkland which adopted the bottom line theory in
cases challenging the validity of an isolated component of a cumulative selec-
tion procedure are a distinct category of courts accepting the bottom line theory
that based their reasoning on the applicant's ability to offset a poor score in one
selection criterion by excelling in another component of the selection pro-
cedure. The other category of courts embracing the bottom line thew-y, typified
by Brown, allowed an employer to use bottom line statistics to justify a
discriminatory component, even though that component operates as a pass-fail
barrier eliminating applicants from any further consideration.'" These courts
16
 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
t" Id. at 425.
"8
 374 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court quoted from Vulcan
Soc. of the New York Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1272
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affil, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the court stated "[M]oreover, the
examination may not be truncated; whether or not it has an adverse impact upon minority
groups should be considered in terms of the total examination procedure."
179 Kirkland, 373 F. Supp. at 1370.
180 See, e.g. , Rule v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 565 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977);
Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 533 F. Supp. 844, 857 n.33 D. Del. 1982) rev'd Wilmore v.
Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983).
193
 For a discussion of selection procedures with pass-fail hurdles, see supra, notes 139-67
and accompanying text.
382
 See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Shoben, Probing, supra note
85, at 31-32.
193
 See supra notes 139-64 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Shoben, Probing, supra note
85, at 30.
184 See supra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
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based their analysis on applicant flow statistics. 1 "S They also inferred an official
endorsement of the bottom line concept by key federal government agencies
when the theory was included in,the Uniform Guidelines.' 86 Although courts of
both categories formed a majority favoring the bottom line approach, a few
federal courts ruled a favorable bottom line should not prevent a plaintiff from
establishing a prima facie case under Title VII by demonstrating the disparate
impact of one requirement in the hiring process.
C. Federal Courts Rejecting the Bottom Line
The acceptance of the bottom line concept in the lower federal courts was
not unanimous. At the same time the bottom line theory was receiving in-
creased acceptance by some courts, other federal courts explicitly rejected the
approach. These courts considered the bottom line results of a hiring process ir-
relevant to the issue of whether a plaintiff may seek the protection of Title VII
when one component of the selection process has a disparate impact on the
plaintiff's protected group. Rather, an entire selection process was deemed
impermissibly discriminatory if one component of the process had an adverse
impact on a statutorily protected group.'"
An early rejection of the bottom line concept occurred in Johnson v. Good-
year Tire and Rubber Co. 188 Goodyear involved a set of facts very similar to
Griggs.' 89 Goodyear required all employees wishing to transfer to skilled posi-
tions within the company to pass a written aptitude test.' 9° Black employees
challenged the test requirement under Title VII, alleging the results of the test
showed an adverse impact was suffered by blacks.' 9 ' The district court found
that Goodyear's test requirement had not resulted in a disparate impact on
blacks since 132 blacks failed the test, while 126 whites likewise failed.' 92 The
appeals court reversed the holding of the district court finding the statistics
'" See discussion of applicant flow statistics supra notes 92-102, 109-14, and accompany-
ing text.
'" See supra notes 119-34, 155-58 and accompanying text.
1 " See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 229 (1977); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Santa Ana, 410 F.
Supp. 873, 894-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See also Rothschild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of
Employment Tests: An Illustration of the Limits of Judicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUDIES 261, 277
(1982); Booth & Mackay, supra note 7, at 156-57.
"" 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
1 '9 For a discussion of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), see supra notes
45-56 and accompanying text.
ig° Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1368. In 1957, Goodyear, like Duke Power Co., required all
new hirees to possess a high school diploma and pass a written aptitude test. The policy also
covered those Goodyear employees who wished to transfer within the company to other depart-
ments. Over the years, the diploma and testing requirements were eventually discontinued, but a
disincentive for blacks who wished to transfer out of the unskilled labor department remained.
Any employee transferring departments would lose all accumulated seniority. Id. at 1368-69.
'" Id. at 1368, 1372.
'" Id. at 1372. The district court measured the disparity between the black and white
failure rate as "a difference of less than 6%." Id.
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relied on by the lower court "erroneous.'"" As the Fifth Circuit indicated,
when read in context, the figures cited by the district court represented a failure
rate of 49% for black candidates compared to 15% for white candidates.'"
Despite the existence of this disparate pass-fail rate, Goodyear at-
tempted to invoke the bottom line concept to refute the evidence of disparate
impact. The company shOwed that it had transferred, and hired black em-
ployees from the surrounding Houston, Texas area in proportion to the black
composition of the local population.'" The appeals court rejected this argu-
ment holding that evidence did not disprove the "essential finding that the tests
had a detrimental impact on black applicants. "196 The court ruled the evidence
merely disclosed that Goodyear had attempted, by other practices, to remove
the taint of the test's consequences.'" In conclusion, the court stated that the
bottom line evidence could not dispel the substantial invidious effect that the
written tests had on black employees and potential employees.'" That effect,
according to the court, was to confine blacks to Goodyear's unskilled labor
department, thereby depriving them of equal employment opportunity.' 99
In EEOC v. Trailways Inc. , 200 a Colorado federal court similarly refused to
allow the use of bottom line statistics to refute the disproportionate impact
caused by a neutral employment requirement on blacks. Trailways, unlike most
bottom line cases, did not involve employment testing. The plaintiff, a black
Trailways employee, challenged the employer's policy of prohibiting the wear-
ing of beards by employees in public contact positions. 20 ' The adverse impact
in this case was attributable to a disease, peculiar to roughly 25% of black
males, which caused shaving to be painful. 202 The plaintiff was among those
blacks who suffered from this ailment and therefore challenged the no beard
policy under the disparate impact method of Title VII analysis. 203
Trailways used bottom line data to argue that the policy had no adverse
effect on blacks since its workforce contained a black representation propor-
tional to the black population in the surrounding area. 204 The Trailways court
'" Id.
194 Id. 274 blacks had taken the written test and 132, or 49%, had failed. 848 whites took
the test and 126, or 15%, failed. Id. at 1372 n.21.
1 " Id. at 1372.
'" Id. at 1373.
' 97 Id.
"9 M.
"9 Id.
200
	 F. Supp. 54 (D. Colo. 1981).
201 Id. at 56. The plaintiff had lost his job as a Trailways driver because of the policy. Id.
202 Id. Plaintiff suffered from pseudofolicultus barbae (I'FB). Id. This skin disease, over-
whelmingly peculiar to blacks makes shaving a painful, and possibly injurious experience. Id.
The only effective treatment for this condition is abstinence from shaving. Id. It is estimated that
approximately 25% of all black males suffer from PFB. Id. Because it was medically necessary for
the plaintiff to allow his beard to grow, the plaintiff claimed the no beard policy had an adverse
impact on blacks. Id.
291 Id.
204 Id. at 55-56.
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was also confronted with persuasive precedent in EEOC v. Greyhound Lines."'
Greyhound involved the same facts as Trailways. In Greyhound, however, the
Third Circuit denied the establishment of a prima facie case because of the em-
ployer's bottom line evidence that there was a higher percentage of black
employees in public contact jobs than in the labor force and general population
of that area. 2"
The Trailways court refused to follow the Third Circuit's Greyhound deci-
sion. Rather, the court viewed the bottom line statistics produced by the
employer in Trailways showing a black representation in the workforce propor-
tional to the local black population as a step towards a blatant quota system.'"
The Trailways court also found the pass-fail rate for blacks excluded by the no
beard policy as more demonstrative of discrimination than the employer's prof-
fered applicant flow data.'" Since 25% of the potential black male applicants
for jobs were eliminated by the policy, the court concluded the no beard policy
had a significant adverse impact on blacks. Therefore, the court allowed the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. 209
D. Summary of the Bottom Line in Federal Courts
The bottom line approach to disparate impact analysis was adopted by
federal courts dealing with two types of employee selection procedures. In one
type, a written test or similar requirement acts as a single pass-fail hurdle
which must be overcome by an applicant seeking employment or promotion."°
266 635 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir. 1980).
"6 Id. at 191. In Greyhound, the court relied on a bottom line population comparison that
showed black males held more than 20% of the jobs at the Philadelphia terminal covered by the
policy, but blacks only comprised 15% of the male population in the labor force of the
Philadelphia SMSA. Id.
" 7 Trailways, 530 F. Supp. at 58. As an example of the quota system, the Trailways court
stated the employer's argument carried to its logical conclusion Would allow an employer to legal-
ly hire no blacks, as long as he maintained one more black employee in his workforce than the
number which represents the proportional representation of the black population in the area. Id.
at 57-58.
200
	 at 59.
209
	 In so ruling, the Trailways court declined to follow the Third Circuit's Greyhound
decision. Id. at 57. The approach of the Trailways court more closely resembled the position of the
dissent in Greyhound.
In that dissent, Circuit Judge Slovitier chastized the Greyhound majority for adopting the
bottom line approach. He termed the bottom line concept a "tautological new rule." EEOC v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 1980) (Slovitier, C. J., dissenting). The dis-
sent considered the majority's acceptance of the bottom line comparisons offered by the employer
as a justification for an admittedly discriminatory policy. The dissent viewed the bottom line con-
cept as a "deceptively subtle" transformation of the disparate impact method of proving
discrimination which could have a devastatingly deleterious effect on the enforcement of Tide
VII. Id. The dissent objected to the bottom line concept's justification of unfairness to the in-
dividual on the basis of fairness to the minority group. Id. at 198. In the dissent's view, in light of
the history of Title VII as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the basic policy of Title VII re-
quired that the court's focus be on fairness to individuals, rather than fairness to groups. Id. at
198.
210 See supra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
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When an individual member of a protected group challenged the adverse im-
pact of this exclusionary hurdle, courts adopting the bottom line approach
would not allow the establishment of a prima facie case on the basis of disparate
pass-fail statistics alone.'" Rather, they looked to the end results of a selection
process to determine, through applicant flow statistics, whether members of the
plaintiff's group were actually selected for hire or promotion in dispropor-
tionately high numbers."' If the applicant flow statistics revealed no disparity,
no violation of Title VII was deemed to have occurred.'"
The other type of employee selection procedure found susceptible to bot-
tom line analysis was the cumulative selection procedure. In the cumulative
procedure, the results of several components are factored together to arrive at
one aggregate rating for a candidate for hire or promotion,'" thereby exposing
applicants to all components of the procedure. Courts applying the bottom line
to this situation also based their decision on favorable applicant flow
statistics.'" The courts reasoned that the possibility of an applicant receiving
offsetting scores on the various parts of the process warranted viewing the en-
tire process in determining whether a selection procedure was impermissibly
discriminatory. 216
The minority of federal courts which rejected the bottom line approach
found applicant flow statistics not to be the most dispositive indicator of
disparate impact. Focusing instead on the exclusionary effects of a particular
employment requirement,'" these courts allowed protected individuals to
establish a prima facie case through statistical analysis of actual pass-fail rates,
even if the employer's applicant flow statistics revealed a favorable treatment of
the individual's group as a whole.'"
2 " See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
212 Id.
III Id. See airs, EEOC v. Navajo Refining, 593 F.2d 988, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1979). A
high school diploma and written aptitude test requirement were challenged for their adverse im-
pact on Spanish Surnamed Americans (SSA's). Id. at 990. The court ruled:
the percentage of SSA's hired during the period at issue exceeded significantly the
percentage of SSA's in the available workforce ... Thus the company is free to use
its tests and high school education requirements if the result is not discrimination in
fact. When 30% of the applicants for jobs are SSA's, from a workforce in the com-
munity of 23.2% SSA's, and 38% of the persons hired by Navajo are SSA's, the re-
quirement of proof of discrimination is not met.
Id. at 992.
2'4
	 supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
lit See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
2 ' 7 See supra notes 227-53 and accompanying text.
216
	 See also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
873, 894-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976). This case involved a challenge to a test component of a selection
procedure which had an adverse impact on Mexican-Americans and acted as a barrier. Id. at
891-94. The court rejected the defendant's applicant flow data that showed the plaintiff's group
of Mexican-Ame .ricans, as a class, were adequately represented at the bottom line. Id. at 894.
The court distinguished Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), discussed supra notes
168-74 and accompanying text, because that case involved a challenge to a subtest of a cumula-
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All of these factors involved in the adoption and rejection of the bottom
line concept in the federal courts, including the role of the theory in cumulative
selection procedures, are present in Connecticut v. Tea1. 219 In Teal, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to consider each of the factors which had con-
tributed to the inconsistent treatment of the bottom line concept in the lower
courts.
III. CONNECTICUT V TEAL
In Connecticut v. Teal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to reject the bottom line approach
to disparate impact Title VII analysis. In Teal, the plaintiffs challenged the em-
ployer's use of a written test in a promotion process."' The test, which was a
mandatory prerequisite for further consideration for promotion, was passed by
79.53% of the white candidates and 54.17% of the black candidates."' On the
basis of the disproportionate pass-fail rate for blacks, the plaintiffs sought to
establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory. The defendant
state employer, however, produced applicant flow data that showed 22.1% of
the black applicants were eventually selected for promotion, while only 13.5%
of the white candidates were promoted. 222 The decision of the Supreme Court
to allow establishment of a Title VII prima facie case on the basis of the
disparate pass-fail rate for the tests, despite the favorable applicant flow data at
the bottom line, runs counter to the view of a majority of federal courts favor-
ing the bottom line approach. 223
This casenote will examine the disposition of Connecticut v. Teal. First, the
treatment of the Teal case at the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals
will be discussed. 224 Second, the majority position of the Supreme Court in Teal
will be presented. 225 Third, the position of the four.
 .dissenting Justices of the
Court, in Teal will be discussed. 226
 Finally, this casenote will undertake an
analysis of both the majority and dissenting opinions in Teal. 227
A. Connecticut v. Teal in the Federal Courts
The plaintiffs in Connecticut v. Teal initiated their action in the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut."' The plaintiffs claimed
tive selection procedure. 410 F. Supp. at 894. The court held "the Civil Rights Acts protect in-
dividuals from discriminatory treatment. The Acts simply do not permit employers to exclude in-
dividuals from employment by use of discriminatory devices. Victims of discrimination are no
less victims when an employer can point to favorable acceptance rates." Id. at 895.
218
 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), discussed infra notes 220-388 and accompanying text.
22° See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
221
 Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1981). 26 of the 48 blacks taking
the test passed, while 206 of the 259 whites taking the test passed. Id. at 136.
222
	 See also discussion supra notes 187-213 and accompanying text.
2x3
	 supra note 6 and discussion supra notes 135-86 and accompanying text.
224 See infra notes 228-57 and accompanying text.
225
 See infra notes 258-316 and accompanying text.
"6 See infra notes 317-53 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 354-88 and accompanying text.
228
 Teal v. State of Connecticut, No. B-79-128, Slip Op. (D. Conn. 1980), reprinted in
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the defendant state employer had violated Title VII by administering and ac-
ting upon the results of a written test which had a disproportionately adverse
impact on black applicants for p -romotion. 229 The district court ruled the plain-
tiffs may not establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory. 230
The court held the defendant employer's bottom line applicant flow statistics
showed blacks had suffered no disparate impact from the promotion process as
a whole."' The district court's decision to allow the employer to refute the
plaintiffs' assertion of disparate impact with the bottom line theory was based
on two factors: applicant flow data"' and the persuasive influence of the bot-
tom line provision of the Uniform Guidelines.'"
The Teal plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."' The plaintiffs argued that
the district court erred in using the results of the entire selection process, rather
than the results of the written test to determine whether black applicants for
promotion had suffered disparate impact. 235 The appeals court agreed with the
plaintiffs 235 and ruled the results of the written test alone were enough to
establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory."'
The court emphasized the fact that the test at issue in Teal acted as a bar-
rier preventing a disproportionately large number of blacks from proceeding to
the next step of the selection process. 238 Title VII, according to the court, was
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17a, Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), reprinted in
BNA's LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7 at 35.
229 Id. at 19a. The plaintiffs originally characterized their Title VII claim as one of
disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. at 22a. For a
discussion of McDonnell Douglas and the disparate treatment theory see supra, notes 33-41 and ac-
companying text. The district court, however, chose to evaluate the plaintiff's case under the
disparate impact theory since it involved a facially neutral selection device. Id. at 22a.
230 Id. at 24a.
23 1 Id.
232 Id. at 22a-23a. For a discussion of applicant flow data, see supra, notes 92-102 and ac-
companying text.
" 2 The district court explained, the Brown court, see discussion supra notes 104-22 and ac-
companying text, adopted the "bottom line approach sanctioned by the EEOC Guidelines" as
did the majority of the courts considering the issue. Teal v. Stare of Connecticut, No. B-79.129,
Slip Op., reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17a, 22a-23a. Accordingly, on the basis of
the higher promotion rate for blacks compared to whites, the district court ruled the plaintiffs had
not established a prima facie case of disparate impact. Id. at 24a.
224
	
F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the opinion of the Second Circuit, see
1980-1981 Annual Survey of Labor Law, Discriminatory Impact of an Employee Selection Process: Teal v.
Connecticut, B.C. L. REV. 82, 275 (1981).
23]
	 F.2d at 137.
236 Id.
2" Id.
"a Id. at 138. To reach this conclusion, it was necessary for the Teal court to distinguish
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1975), discussed supra
notes 174-80, which it had decided several years prior to Teal. In Kirkland, the Second Circuit
had agreed with a district court ruling that it would conflict with the dictates of common sense to
apply disparate impact to the separate components of a test scored on the basis of the cumulative
results of all the components. Id. at 425. The Teal court left the Kirkland ruling intact by
distinguishing between the use of the bottom line concept in cumulative selection procedures,
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intended by Congress to protect individuals and not "faceless groups. "289
Court thus concluded that allowing the overall selection process result to
validate what may be the denial of equal employment opportunities to pro-
tected individuals, is "an expedient that transgresses the purpose of Title
VII. "240
In reaching its final decision, the appeals court rejected two arguments
presented by the Teal defendants which had been drawn from prior Second
Circuit decisions. 24 t First, the court rejected an argument favoring the bottom
line approach under principles of judicial economy. 242 It was maintained that
courts should not examine each component of a selection process because once
this inquiry has begun, the court might be prompted to investigate further
subtests of that component and possibly individual test questions. 243 The Teal
court agreed that a detailed investigation of component parts would be inap-
propriate when a component requirement of a cumulative selection process is
challenged.'" In a cumulative process, the court reasoned, all applicants are
exposed to several components which would enable them to offset a poor per-
formance in a single part.' 45 When a selection process contained a dis-
criminatory pass-fail barrier, however, the court saw "little justification for
judicial restraint. , '246 The plaintiffs in cases involving pass-fail barriers are
prevented from participating in subsequent selection practices. 247 Therefore,
because these plaintiffs are totally denied employment opportunity, and since
the barrier to that opportunity is readily identifiable, the Teal court concluded
courts were under an obligation to entertain these individual claims of discrimi-
nation.'" In so deciding, the Second Circuit narrowed the scope of its holding
in Teal to cases involving a selection component that has a disparate impact
and constitutes a pass-fail barrier.'"
and in cases such as Teal where a discriminatory component of a selection procedure can act as a
barrier. 645 F.2d at 137. The Teal court explained that a cumulative process allows candidates to
benefit from other components in the process which may theoretically offset a candidate's poor
performance in a discriminatory component. Id. A component that functions as a pass-fail bar-
rier, on the other hand, is the type of obvious denial of employment opportunity the Teal court
concluded is not permitted under Title VII. Id. at 138. The court distinguished Smith v. Troyan,
520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), on the same basis. 645 F.2d at 138.
239 Id. at 138. For the text of the statute, see supra note 22.
"° Teal, 645 F.2d at 140.
24 ' Id. at 138-39. The two arguments were drawn from Brown v. New Haven Civil
Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979), discussed supra notes 139-64 and accompanying
text, and Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975),
discussed supra note 238. The Teal defendants relied heavily on Brown which, due to its factual
similarity to Teal, was implicitly overruled by the Second Circuit's Teal opinion. 645 F.2d at 139.
242 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
2" Teal, 645 F.2d at 138.
244 Id. at 139.
242
 Id. For a discussion of cumulative selection procedures see supra, notes 164-83 and ac-
companying text.
2" 645 F.2d at 139.
2" See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
2'8 645 F.2d at 139.
244 Id. at 135.
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The second argument offered in favor of the bottom line approach claimed
employers were encouraged to adopt voluntary affirmative action programs
under the bottom line concept."° The Teal court also rejected this argument as
a reason for adopting the bottom line approach. While conceding that volun-
tary affirmative action programs, while not required under Title VII,'" con-
tribute towards achieving a racial balance in the workforce, 252 the court rea-
soned that such affirmative action had never been held to relieve an employer
of Title VII liability to persons injured by the employer's previous discrimina-
tory conduct."' Therefore the court deemed the employer's deliberate effort to
promote proportionately more blacks at the end of the selection process in Teal
of little comfort to individuals not permitted to advance beyond a discrimina-
tory pass-fail barrier. 254
The decision of the Second Circuit in Teal to reject the bottom line ap-
proach was largely based on the individual focus of Title VII. 255
 The court
referred to the language of the statute itself, which speaks of depriving "any in-
dividual of employment opportunities," 256
 in concluding the favorable treat-
ment of blacks as a whole could not immunize an employer from Title VII
liability for a discriminatory test. 2"
B. Connecticut v. Teal in the Supreme Court
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the
Second Circuit by holding that a favorable bottom line does not preclude an in-
dividual from establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on the dis-
parate impact of a single component of the selection process."' The Court fur-
ther held that a non-discriminatory bottom line does not provide an employer
with a defense to such a prima facie case of disparate impact. 259 At the outset of
its opinion, the Court confronted whether the application of an examination
25° Id. at 139. The Teal court quoted the affirmative action argument verbatim from
Brown. Id. at 138-39. The affirmative action argument surfaced again in the Supreme Court's
decision in Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2540 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). See infra note 424.
"' Id. at 139. Section 702(j) states in pertinent part: "Nothing contained in this title
shall be interpreted to require any employer ... subject to this title to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual, or to any group because of race ...."
252 645 F.2d at 139.
2" Id. The court cited Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) as
holding "a racially balanced workforce cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific
acts of discrimination." 645 F.2d at 139. The Teal court then stated, "[I]n the case at bar, an
employee selection device produced a readily discernable disparate impact upon the black can-
didates. The affirmative action effort then taken by the defendants at the end of the process was
of 'little comfort' to the candidates who were not permitted to proceed beyond the allegedly
discriminatory barrier." Id. at 139-40.
254 Id. at 139.
233 Id. at 140.
236 Id. at 134 n.1, 138.
257
 Id, at 139.
23" 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529 (1982).
23" Id.
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that both bars a disproportionate number of black employees from considera-
tion for promotion and has not been shown to be job related presents a claim
cognizable under Title VII. 260
 The Court next addressed the problem of at
which stage in the selection process it is proper to apply disparate impact
analysis. 261
 The Court also considered an argument, submitted by the United
States as amicus curiae in support of the employer, that the favorable bottom
line results demonstrated the written test was not "used to discriminate"
against blacks within the meaning of Title VII and thus the use of the test was
protected under the statute. 262 Finally, the majority considered whether the
presence of favorable bottom line evidence should impose an increased burden
on a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case, or whether such evidence
may serve as an affirmative defense for an employer confronted with a prima
facie case. 26'
To determine whether the challenge to the written examination in Teal
presented a claim cognizable under Title VII, the Court first reviewed the
language of the statute- 264 The Court centered its analysis on Section
703(a)(2). 265
 Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII renders unlawful any attempt by an
employer to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
deprives any individual of employment opportunities. 266
 The primary purpose
of Congress in enacting Title VII, the majority emphasized, was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers to that equality. 267
The Court then reviewed its landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
which interpreted Section 703(a)(2) as prohibiting employment practices that
deny equal employment opportunity through their adverse impact on statutori-
ly protected groups. 266
 By declaring unlawful an examination that clearly had a
disparate impact on blacks, and barred promotion, the Teal majority stressed
26° Id. at 2530.
261 Id. at 2532-33.
262 Id. at 2533.
263 Id. at 2534.
264 Id. at 2530.
263
 (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(2).
2s® Id.
267 Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
266
	 at 2530. Reviewing the purpose behind the disparate impact theory developed in
Griggs, the Court quoted language from McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In that case, the Court stated "Griggs was rightly concerned that the childhood deficiencies in the
education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be
allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their
lives." Id. at 806. 102 S. Ct. at 2531.
July 1983]
	
CASENOTES	 1163
the outcome in Griggs was consistent with the congressional intent behind Title
VII. 269
The Court then applied the Griggs disparate impact standard of Title VII
review to the facts of Teal. The Court concluded the plaintiffs had presented a
claim cognizable under Title VII when they challenged the employer's use of
the written test."° The test, the majority reasoned, which had a discriminatory
impact on black employees, and effectively barred promotion, clearly fell
within the literal language of Section 703(a)(2) as interpreted by Griggs."'
Specifically, the Court viewed the challenged test in Teal as precisely the type of
non job related barrier which could deny a member of a protected group
employment opportunity in violation of Title VII. 2"
The Court then turned its attention to the central question of whether
disparate impact is most appropriately measured at the point where the chal-
lenged test was administered, or at the end of the overall selection process, that
is, the bottom line."' The Court emphasized that when considering claims
under Section 703(a)(2), it had consistently focused in past cases on the partic-
ular employment and promotion requirements that created a discriminatory
bar to employment opportunities. 274 The Court stated it had never read Sec-
tion 703(a)(2) as requiring the focus to be placed on the overall number of
minority or female applicants actually hired or promoted. 275 Accordingly, the
majority rebuked the district court's bottom line approach to disparate impact
in Teal by reiterating the purpose of Title VII. 276 The majority stated that to
suggest disparate impact should only be measured at the bottom line ignores
the fact that Title VII guarantees protected individuals an opportunity to com-
pete equally with white workers on the basis of job related criteria. 277 The
Court again cited Title VII's goal to achieve equality Of opportunity by
2" Id. at 2532. The Court discussed the legislative history of the 1972 extension of Title
VII by Congress to cover state and municipal employees. The majority concluded that the Con-
gress felt the public sector employees needed the protection of Title VII to ensure equality of op-
portunity and the elimination of barriers to professional development. Id. The Court especially
noted the Congressional concern over the widespread use by state and local governments of in-
valid selection techniques that had a discriminatory impact. Id.
2" Id. at 2533.
"' Id. at 2532-33.
272
 Id. at 2532.
278
"4 Id.
272
	 The Court cited: Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (minimum height
and weight requirements for prison guards acted as an arbitrary barrier to employment oppor-
tunity for women); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, (1975) (tests required for pro-
motion and transfer were barriers to blacks); and New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 584 (1979), wherein the Court stated "[a] prima facie violation of the Act may be estab-
lished by statistical evidence showing the employment practice has the effect of denying the
members of one race equal access to employment opportunities." (emphasis the Court's).
"6
 102 S. Ct. at 2533. For a discussion of the disposition of Teal in the district court see
supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
277 Id.
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eliminating arbitrary, unnecessary, and artificial barriers that have a
discriminatory impact on individuals. 278 The majority concluded, therefore,
that the Teal plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact at
the written test stage of the promotion process.'" The Court accordingly
shifted the burden to the defendant employer to show the written test was ac-
tually related to job performance. 28 °
The Court also considered an argument submitted by the United States as
amicus curiae for the employer."' Although the government recognized a Title
VII issue was presented in Teal, it nevertheless sought to allow the employer to
invoke the testing defense explicitly provided in the statute. 282 Section 703(h)
allows an employer to give a test and act upon its results provided the test is not
designed, intended, or used to discriminate. 2" The United States argued the
non-discriminatory applicant flow data for blacks ultimately selected at the bot-
tom line proved the test was not being used to discriminate within the meaning
of Title VII. 284
 The Court rejected the government's argument. The majority
saw the government's theory as an attempt to offer a "special haven" for
discriminatory tests within the statute. 285
 The Court ruled the Title VII provi-
sion cited by the government only refers to the use of tests that are proven to be
job related but result in a disparate racial impact. 286
 Employment tests are con-
sidered job related only after the completion of a validation study detailed in
the Uniform Guidelines.'" Since the test in Teal had not yet been found job
related, the majority concluded it was "used to discriminate" within the mean-
ing of Section 703(h) if it was used to limit equal employment opportunities.'"
In the final section of its opinion, the Teal majority considered an argu-
ment presented by the employer and some amici that the bottom line' concept
should have some role in the disparate impact order of proof. The employer
submitted that where an employer had compensated for a discriminatory pass-
fail barrier by hiring or promoting blacks at a higher rate than whites at the
bottom line, a plaintiff attempting to establish a prima facie case should satisfy
an additional burden. 289
 Specifically, the employer argued the showing of
disparate results suffered by the plaintiff's group on the test was not enough. 2"
27 ' Id.
"9 Id.
26° Id.
281 Id. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Connecticut v. Teal,
102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), reprinted in BNA's LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7 at 307. The EEOC re-
fused to join the Government's brief. Id. at 1.
282 102 S. Ct. at 2533.
263 See supra note 79 for text of the statute.
264 102 S. Ct. at 2533. See also Brief for the United States supra note 281 at 9, Connecticut
v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), reprinted in BNA's LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7 at 307.
285
 102 S. Ct. at 2533.
286 Id
287 See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
286 Id. at 2534.
289 Id.
490 Brief for Petitioner at 21, Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982), reprinted in
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The employer asked that the plaintiff be compelled to prove that the entire
selection procedure had an adverse effect on the plaintiff's protected group. 2"
Alternatively, the employer sought to allow favorable bottom line evidence to
be used as an affirmative defense by a defendant employer. 292 As an affirmative
defense, bottom line evidence could successfully rebut a prima facie case in the
same way a showing of job-relatedness would dispose of a Title VII action. The
Court rejected both these arguments.'"
The Court characterized these suggestions by the employer as "nothing
more than a request that we redefine the protections guaranteed by Title
VII."'" The guarantee, according to the majority, is the prohibition of prac-
tices that would deprive any individual of employment opportunities. 233 Pro-
tection of the individual employee, not the minority group as a whole, the
Court again stated, is the principle focus of the statute. 296 The Court rejected
the employer's argument for the use of bottom line evidence as an employer's
defense on three grounds. First, the Court explained that the Uniform
Guidelines provision incorporating the bottom line concept provided no such
defense for an employer. 297 Second, the Court distinguished between the em-
ployer defenses used in disparate impact and disparate treatment actions.'"
Third, the Court ruled that allowing a bottom line defense would contravene
the intent of Congress.'"
In a lengthy footnote, the Teal majority reviewed the inclusion of the bot-
tom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines. 300 The Court stated the guidelines
were not a binding endorsement of the bottom line theory and were of no
defensive use to the employer."' Furthermore, according to the Court, the
guidelines had no effect on the ability of an individual to challenge a particular
discriminatory component of a selection process which otherwise results in a
nondiscriminatory bottom line. 362
In further addressing the defendant employer's attempt to secure the bot-
tom line concept as a defense, the Court reviewed the role of an employer de-
fense in a disparate impact case." 3 The majority explained favorable bottom
BNA'S LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7 at 105.
29] Id.
292
 102 S. Ct. at 2534.
293 Id.
2" Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 For a discussion of the bottom line concept in the Uniform Guidelines, see supra notes
119-34 and accompanying text.
298
	
a discussion of the orders of proof under disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact see supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
299 See infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text and note 369.
9°° 102 S. Ct. at 2534 n.12.
3°' Id.
302 Id.
a°' at 2535.
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line evidence is relevant in a disparate treatment action where the determina-
tion of the employer's discriminatory intent is the dispositive issue.'" The
Court stated that in a disparate treatment case, good faith efforts by the em-
ployer to achieve a non-discriminatory work force could help rebut an in-
ference of intentional discrimination. 3" In a disparate impact action, however,
intent is not an issue. Therefore, the Teal majority saw the use of bottom line
evidence in an employer's defense to a disparate impact claim as an attempt to
justify discrimination against a statutorily protected individual on the basis of
favorable treatment of that individual's racial group as a whole.'"
Additionally, in the Court's view, to allow a bottom line defense would
above all contradict the intent of Congress."' According to the Teal majority,
Congress never intended to give an employer a license to discriminate on the
basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the
employee's group.'" The Court again underscored the obligation imposed by
Title VII. That obligation, in the majority's view, is to provide equal oppor-
tunity for each applicant, regardless of race and without regard to whether
members of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the
workforce. 309
In finding for the individual plaintiffs and rejecting the bottom line con-
cept, the Supreme Court resolved several issues. The Court reaffirmed the
scope of the disparate impact theory, first set forth in Griggs, as prohibiting the
use of selection devices which result in an adverse impact on groups protected
under Title VII. 310
 The Court also ruled that disparate impact analysis must be
applied to the particular component in a selection process which functions to
bar individual applicants from employment opportunities, rather than applied
to the end results of the entire selection process. 3 " The Teal majority clarified
the applicability of section 703(h) of Title VII to testing cases by ruling that the
provision only allows the use of employment tests which are found to be job
related. 312 The Teal opinion also rejects any possible use of the bottom line con-
cept as either a means of increasing a plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima
facie case, or providing an employer with an affirmative defense to a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII."'" In the process of its reasoning,
"4 Id. See also supra note 71-72 and accompanying text.
"5
 102 S. Ct. at 2535. The Court cited language from its decision in Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) wherein the Court stated: "Proof that a
workforce is racially balanced, or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of
minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent, when that issue has yet to be
decided." 102 S. Ct. at 2535.
3 °6 Id.
322 Id.
"6 Id.
309 Id.
310 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 270-80 and accompanying text.
312  See supra notes 281-88 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 289-309 and accompanying text.
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the Court dismissed the persuasive value of the bottom line provision in the
Uniform Guidelines, 314 clarified the role of the statistical defense in disparate
treatment as opposed to disparate impact actions, 315 and continuously em-
phasized the paramount concern of the Congress when enacting Title VII was
the protection of the individua.I. 3 "
C. The Dissenting Opinion in Teal
Despite its internal consistency, the majority opinion met with some
disagreement. Justice Powell authored a dissenting opinion in Connecticut v.
Teal that was joined by three other Justices."' The dissenters focused on
several issues to support their view that the Teal majority had decided the case
incorrectly. First, the dissent stated the majority had improperly blurred the
distinction between the disparate impact and disparate treatment methods of
Title VII analysis.'" Second, the dissenters advocated the application of
disparate impact analysis only to the overall results of a selection procedure as
the proper use of the disparate impact theory. 313 Third, the dissenters believed
the overwhelming weight of legal authority favored the use of the bottom line
concept. 32° Finally, the dissent focused on what it considered several unfor-
tunate consequences of the majority opinion in Teal."'
The dissent maintained that the majority blurred the critical distinction
between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. 322 The distinc-
tion that Powell and the dissenters see between the two theories is that
disparate treatment focuses on the way in which an individual has been treated
by an employer, while disparate impact is only concerned with the condition of
the group protected under Title VII. 323 Consequently, in what the dissent
termed a "key distinction," disparate impact cannot be used to vindicate the
rights of an individual when that individual's protected group as a whole has
"4 See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
3'5 See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
317
 Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
318 Id.
319 Id. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting).
320 Id. at 2538-39 (Powell, J., dissenting),
321 Id. at 2539-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories of Title VII analysis see supra notes 32-73 and accompanying text.
"' 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting). In support of his view of distinct theories
for groups and individuals under Title VII, Justice Powell presented a different interpretation of
Griggs s. Duke Power Co., than that employed by the majority. The dissent begins its review of the
language of 703(a)(2) just as the majority had done. The dissent acknowledged the language of
the statute "suggests discrimination only occurs on an individual basis." Id. at 2536. In the dis-
sent's view, however, Griggs expanded the scope of the statute by its holding that discriminatory
intent by the employer against an individual need not be shown when employment practices of
mechanisms operate as "built in headwinds for minority groups." Id. Thus in the dissent's view,
Griggs stands for the proposition that the adverse impact of an employer's practices on a protected
group can also violate $ 703(a)(2). Id. (emphasis added).
1168	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1131
not been subjected to discrimination from the total selection process. 324 In the
dissenters' view, the majority reached a conclusion which is inconsistent with
the very nature of disparate impact claims by allowing the individual plaintiffs
in Teal to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact when the results of the
employer's entire selection process showed no discriminatory impact had been
suffered by their group as a whole.'"
Justice Powell attempted to explain the divergent results of the majority
and dissent's use of disparate impact analysis. Justice Powell contended that
the majority confused the individualistic aim of Title VII with the legal theories
through which a plaintiff may bring an action under the statute. 326 The dissent
agreed with the majority that the primary aim of Title VII is to protect in-
dividuals."' Nonetheless, Title VII jurisprudence, in the dissent's view, pro-
vides two distinct methods of establishing a .violation of the statute. 328 In a
disparate treatment action, an individual plaintiff may allege that intentional
discrimination was personally directed towards him without reference to his
protected group.'" In a disparate impact action, on the other hand, an in-
dividual may establish a prima facie case premised upon the adverse impact of
an employment practice suffered by his group as a whole."° If the group has
suffered discrimination, the plaintiff may, according to the dissent, draw a fair
inference that he, as a member of the group, has also suffered the adverse effect
of a discriminatory selection procedure."' In the dissent's opinion, the majori-
ty therefore improperly allowed the establishment of a prima facie case by the
- Teal plaintiffs when the total selection process had no adverse effect upon the
plaintiffs' group. The dissent would hold no violation of Title VII under the
disparate impact theory existed in Teal in the absence of an adverse impact
upon the protected group. 332
The dissent in Teal advocated the adoption of the bottom line approach
itself by contending that disparate impact analysis should only be applied to the
ultimate hiring or promotion results at the end of the total selection process. 333
The dissent noted that the applicant flow statistics in Teal revealed 22.9% of
the blacks entering the promotion process were selected for advancement,
while only 13.5% of the original white candidates were ultimately promoted. 334
Based on these group figures, the dissent concluded that any attempt to say the
324 Id. at 2536-37.
325 Id. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
326 Id, at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also, supra notes 258-309 and accompanying
text.
327 102 S. Ct. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3213 Id.
322 Id,
330 id.
' 3 ' Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting).
334 Id. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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selection process had an unfavorable disparate impact on blacks was to "ignore
reality. "335
The dissent also argued that the weight of legal authority supported the
adoption of the bottom line theory. 336 The dissent noted the adoption of the
bottom line concept by the E.E.O.C. and other federal enforcement agencies
in their Uniform Guidelines."' In addition, the dissent observed that the ma-
jority concentrated on cases of "questionable relevance" as support for its
opinion,"a including some previous Supreme Court opinions cited by the ma-
jority. 339
Finally, the last section of the dissent centers on the likely consequences of
the Court's holding in Teal. 34° First, the dissenters felt the Court's holding will
force employers either to eliminate tests, or rely on expensive alternative job
related testing measures."' The dissent speculates, however, that even this
type of selection criteria might also be subjected to a Title VII challenge."'
Secondly, the dissent felt the Teal decision will lead to simple quota hiring by
state and local governments, because these employers are unable to incur the
prohibitive cost of test validation studies and litigation due to fiscal
constraints. 343 Furthermore, the dissent in Teal envisions the increased use of
cumulative selection procedures."'" In the dissent's view, the actual hiring
decisions from a cumulative process would not be subject to disparate impact
analysis as defined in the majority opinion."' Rather, an employer could argue
335
3" Id. at 2537.38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 2537 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent cites the Uniform Guidelines in
support of its statement "There can be no violation of Title VII on the basis of disparate impact,
in the absence of disparate impact on a group." Id. For a discussion of the Uniform Guidelines'
adoption of the bottom line concept, see supra, notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
3" Id. at 2538 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting). To support this position, the dissent cites the
fact that most lower courts confronting this issue have concluded that there can be no finding of
discrimination in the absence of an adverse impact at the bottom line. Id. See also, supra note 6.
339
 102 S. Ct. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting). For example, the majority cited language
from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) to support its decision to reject the bottom line
concept. 102 S. Ct. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Dothard, the Court had struck down the
facially neutral height and weight requirements for prison guards in Alabama, because the stand-
ards had an adverse impact on women. 433 U.S. at 324, 331. The Teal majority cited Dothard to
illustrate that in that case, despite a disproportionate bottom line representation of women, the
Court focused its analysis on the exclusionary effect of the employment requirement rather than
the disproportionate bottom line. 102 S. Ct. at 2532-33. Conversely, Justice Powell and the
dissenters feel Dothard represented a case where the adverse impact of the challenged standards
was proven by the discriminatory bottom line. Id. at 2538 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' 4° Id. at 2539 (Powell, J., dissenting). This casenote will also offer a separate treatment
of the likely consequences of Teal, infra notes 389-444 and accompanying text.
34'
	 S. Ct. at 2539 (Powell, J., dissenting).
342
 Id. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Inst. v. St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980) discussed in
Note, Promotion Tests and Statistical Evidence of Disparate Impact: The Eighth Circuit's Position, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1145 (1981).
3'3 102 S. Ct. at 2539-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2540 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
345 Id.
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that the bottom line concept was still viable in the cumulative context since no
one portion of a cumulative selection procedure would act as a "barrier" to
employment opportunity. 316 Consequently, in the dissent's view, an employer
maintaining a cumulative selection process would only have to select a number
of statutorily protected individuals proportionate to their representation in the
community to escape liability. 34? Finally, the dissent predicts the Teal holding
may actually result in fewer members of statutorily protected groups being
selected for employment. 348 Without an incentive for employers to make
affirmative action adjustments at the bottom line, the dissent expressed fear
that fewer protected individuals will surpass a validated examination. 349 The
dissent suggested that as long as a written test is shown to be job related, an
employer will be under no obligation to adjust the test results to favor members
of groups protected under Title VII. 35 °
In summary, the Teal dissent was premised on the dissenters' belief that
the majority had blurred the distinction between disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment by incorrectly allowing an individual to establish a prima
facie case under disparate impact when the individual's group suffered no
adverse effects from the entire process. 35 ' Moreover, the dissent contended that
the majority had improperly applied disparate impact analysis to an in-
termediate stage of the selection process. The dissent argued that existing
authority favored the application of disparate impact only to the overall results
of the selection process, that is, only to the bottom line. 352 As a result, the dis-
senters envisioned several unfortunate consequences of the Court's holding in
Tea1. 3"
Connecticut v. Teal will have widespread implications for both employers
and protected individuals as a seminal Supreme Court decision interpreting
Title VII. The fundamental decision over the validity of the bottom line ap-
proach to disparate impact which divided the lower federal courts also caused a
division among the Justices of the Supreme Court. For these reasons it is
crucial to understand fully the respective positions of the majority and dissent-
ing Justices of the Court regarding the "bottom line."
D. Analysis of Connecticut v. Teal
A fundamental disagreement exists between the majority and dissent in
Teal over the appropriate method of furthering the purpose of Title VII. The
majority opinion, however, was correct in choosing to reject the bottom line
348
 Id.
"7 Id.
348 Id. at 2540 (Powell, J., dissenting).
349 Id,
330 Id.
"' See supra notes 322-32 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 333-47 and accompanying text.
953 See supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text.
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concept. The majority correctly perceived the proper purpose of Title VII and
applied the statute in a manner consistent with that: purpose. The purpose of
Title VII, as articulated by the majority, is the protection of individuals from
the discriminatory denial of equal employment opportunity. The dissent's
adoption of the bottom line approach would deny relief to protected individuals
who had suffered a clear deprivation of equal emplOyment opportunity from
the use of a discriminatory selection device. Thus, the dissent's support of the
bottom line concept fails to appreciate the individual focus of the congressional
intent embodied in Title VII.
The majority and dissent in Teal primarily differ over the proper use of the
disparate impact method of Title VII analysis. The dissent's approach in Teal
would result in a narrow application of disparate impact, limiting the establish-
ment of a prima facie case under the theory to those instances when the overall
results of an employment selection procedure show a protected group has suf-
fered from an adverse impact.'" Under the majority view, the submission of
bottom line evidence demonstrating the overall procedure, including a written
test had no adverse impact is irrelevant because Title VII guarantees the in-
dividuals the right to compete equally for employment opportunities. 355 The
dissent agreed with the majority that individuals are the target of Title VII, but
the dissent adamantly maintained the statute has two distinct methods of
analysis. 356 Only when a protected group as a whole has suffered an adverse
impact from the entire selection process, would the dissent allow a member of
that group to invoke disparate impact analysis.'" Otherwise, in the dissent's
view, without a disparate impact on the group when applicants are selected for
hire or promotion, an individual is limited to the use of the disparate treatment
theory under Title VII.'"
In contrast, the majority holds the individual focus of Title VII demands
that a plaintiff be allowed to establish a prima facie case based on the disparate
results of a single test or selection device alone. 359 In support of its position that
an individual may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact even if his
group is favorably treated at the bottom line, the majority cited the plain
language of Title VII itself as the strongest evidence that the statute is intended
to ensure equal employment opportunities for individuals. The language of
Section 703(a)(2) in particular explicitly forbids depriving "any individual of
employment opportunities."'" As the majority properly indicates, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. expanded the reach of Title VII by proscribing not only inten-
tional discrimination, but also employment practices that are fair in form, but
354 See supra notes 317-53 and accompanying text.
3 " See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
356 Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2537 (1982),(Powell, J., dissenting).
3 " See supra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
"" Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
356 See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
360 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory in operation. 36 t Griggs specifically focused on practices, pro-
cedures, or tests that deny equal employment opportunity. 362 The majority
reviewed the Griggs rationale that Congress' primary purpose in Title VII is to
achieve equality in employment opportunity and remove the barriers to that
equality. 363 The rule of Griggs, in conjunction with the language of Section
703(a)(2), operates to prohibit the use of tests or procedures which act to limit
or classify applicants in a way which deprives any individual of equal employ-
ment opportunities. 364
 Like the test at issue in Griggs, the examination ad-
ministered by the employer in Teal had a clearly adverse effect on protected in-
dividuals. 365 In this way, the test alone operated as a discriminatory barrier to
employment opportunity for those protected individuals who failed, and were
thereby eliminated from consideration for a promotion. 366 If the bottom line
concept were successfully applied in Teal, these individuals who suffered from
the form of employment discrimination explicitly prohibited by Griggs, would
be left wronged, but deprived of a cause of action under Title VII.
The Teal majority correctly recognized that the individual is to be the
focus of the protection offered by Title VII. In addition, the majority effectively
refuted the bottom line concept by reasoning that Title VII is not limited to the
prevention of discrimination in the actual selection of individuals for jobs or
promotions. Title VII clearly applies to the selection of individuals for par-
ticular positions, however, in a broader respect, the statute also preserves the
right of protected individuals to receive equal employment opportunities. 367
361 hi
362 See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
363 Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2531. In Griggs, the Supreme Court stated:
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification. Congress has now provided that
tests for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity in the sense
of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has
now required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken into account.
It has to resort again to the fable — provided that the vessel in which the milk is
proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion, but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro-
hibited.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added).
364 See supra notes 45-73 and accompanying text.
365 Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (1982).
366 Id.
367 102 S. Ct. at 2531, The majority's concentration on the precise language chosen by
Congress for 703(a)(2) is exacerbated by an interesting footnote to the majority's discussion of
the statute covering not only actual jobs or promotion, but also "limitations" and classifications
that deprive any individual of employment opportunities. Id. The majority contrasts the wording
of 5 703(a)(2), supra note 265, to that of 703(a)(1). Section 703(a)(1) states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. .
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
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The language of Title VII itself is clear in expressing its prohibition of the
deprivation of "employment opportunities" to "individuals." 368 In addition,
the legislative history of the statute includes repeated references to the purpose
of Title VII as being the protection of equal employment opportunities for in-
dividuals. 369
 Senator Dirkson of Illinois articulated the purpose of Title VII
succinctly during the floor debates prior to the statute's passage. He stated that
the statute "does not deal with the volume of employment, or the number of
people assigned to jobs. It deals with equal employment opportunity, nothing
more."370
 The majority was mindful of this congressional intent and recog-
nized the disparate impact theory developed in Griggs as a vehicle through
which individual rights are vindicated."'
conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The majority speculates that were 703(a)(1) the only protection offered employees and
applicants under Title VII, it might support the employer's argument that disparate impact
discrimination should only be measured at the bottom line. 102 S. Ct. at 2531 n.9. Although
both statutory provisions refer to the protection of individuals, $ 703(a)(1) is worded to cover
"hire" and "discharge". Thus under $ 703(a)(1), the bottom line theory, which focuses on how
many protected group members are actually hired, would be appropriate. In contrast, $
703(a)(2) forbids the classification of employees in a way which would deny "employment oppor-
tunities." Employment "opportunities" is a much broader term connoting more than actual
receipt of a job. Thus, through this footnote, the majority underscores the significance of the use
of the words "employment opportunities" by Congress. Under the broader language of $
703(a)(2), the Court has authority for its decision to reject the bottom line theory, and measure
disparate impact at the testing stage of the selection process where employment opportunity may
be denied.
366 See supra note 265.
36' Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, bipartisan floor managers of Title VII in
the Senate, submitted an "Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII" to the Senate during the
debates on passage of the title in 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964). In the memo, the Senators
stress that the statute protects "any individual". Id. When discussing the issue of what to do
about an employer maintaining a racial balance in His workforce, the memo states, lilt must be
emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual. While the presence or absence
of other members of the same minority group in the workforce may be a relevant factor in deter-
mining whether in a given case, to hire or refuse to hire was based on race, color etc., it is only
one question and the question in each case would be whether the individual was discriminated against."
Id. at 7213 (emphasis added).
In addition, Senator Humphrey, a vigorous proponent of Title VII's passage, stated: "a
citizen of the United States is entitled to equal opportunity to succeed." 110 CONG. REC. 13082
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). "Whenever people are denied work opportunities because
of race, religion, or ethnic origin, it is not only the individual that is injured, but it is the nation."
Id. at 13084. Senator Humphrey continued, " . the issue here is not, how many people are
employed, the issue is whether a man shall be denied the opportunity to be employed on the basis
of his merit, and whether we shall provide a legal instrument to have justice done in
employment." Id. See also 110 CONG. REC. 13078 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Cooper) ("As I
understand an employer ... could not discriminate, he could not deny a person a job, or dismiss
a person, or promote on the grounds of his color, or his religion .."), 110 CONG. REC. 8921
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Every man must be judged according to his ability. In that
respect all men are to have an equal opportunity to be considered for a particular job.")
370 110 CONG. REC. 13084 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
3" Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2535 (1982).
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Unfortunately, the dissenters have a different outlook concerning
disparate impact analysis. The dissent feels Griggs and every subsequent
disparate impact case has concerned whether the protected group, not the pro-
tected individual, has suffered an adverse impacts.'" Under the dissent's
disparate impact scenario, whether the group has suffered adverse impact may
only be determined from the applicant flow data produced at the bottom
line."' The dissent's construction of Griggs and its progeny, however, ignores
the fact that those actions were based on Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 34 That
provision of the statute, both on its face, and as construed by the Supreme
Court, does not refer to the hiring or selection of protected groups by an
employer. 375 On the contrary, the statute, as the Court has repeatedly stated,
prohibits the use of employment requirements which deprive protected in-
dividuals of equal employment opportunities through their disproportionate
impact. 376
The employment test administered by the employer in Teal indisputably
had an adverse impact on the plaintiffs' statutorily protected group."' As an
individual member of that group, the plaintiff was prevented by this
discriminatory barrier from receiving an equal opportunity for a promotion. 378
"' Id. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3'3 Id. at 2537. See also, supra notes 333-35 and accompanying text,
" This is the same statutory provision under which the Griggs Court ruled the objective
of the Congress was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers"
such as tests and other discriminatory procedures. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
375 The Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the individual focus of Title VII in City of
Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). In that case,
the employer required female employees to make larger contributions to their pension plan than
male employees because women as a group live longer than men. Id. at 707. When the pension
program was challenged under Title VII, the Court was faced with the problem of what to do
about the individual women who do not live longer than men. The Court framed the issue,
"whether the existence or nonexistence of discrimination is to be determined by a comparison of
class characteristics, or individual characteristics." Id. at 708. To resolve this issue, the Court ex-
amined the language of 703(a)(1), supra note 367, and emphasized the fact the statute refers to
"any individual." Id. Therefore, the Court concluded, "the statute's focus on the individual is
unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual, or national class." Id. The Court further stated, "[e]ven if the statutory language was
less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to
classes." Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
"6 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14, 806 (1973); In-
ternational Bh'd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-49 (1975); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583
(opinion of Marshall, J.) (1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977). See also
discussion supra notes 42-108 and accompanying text.
377 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
37" In this way, the test had a discriminatory impact similar to that imposed by the
testing procedure at issue in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), discussed at
supra notes 57-58. In that opinion, the Court while discussing the EEOC testing guidelines in ef-
fect at that time, stated: "The message of these guidelines is the same of that of the Griggs case —
that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown by professionally acceptable methods to
be predictive of, or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which are
relevant to the job, or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated." Id. at 431.
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Despite the fact that the plaintiff's protected group as a whole suffered no
discrimination from the bottom line promotion decisions, the plaintiff never-
theless was denied employment opportunity within the meaning of Title
VII. 379
The majority opinion in Teal enables individuals who have suffered racial
• or other types of discrimination, to protect their right to equal employment op-
portunities by removing the barrier which favors some employees over
others.'" This outcome is consistent with Congress' paramount concern with
the individual in the enactment of Title VII. The dissent would not recognize a
disparate impact claim unless the disparate impact was evident at the bottom
line."' This would leave only the disparate treatment theory available for an
aggrieved individual. The dissent must be aware, however, that the disparate
treatment theory is tailored for intentional discrimination which is specifically
targeted at an individual.'" In a case like Teal, where a facially neutral
employment practice such as a written test is to be challenged, discriminatory
intent is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove. 383 Consequently,
despite the fact that the examination in Teal had been established as
discriminatory, the dissent's preference for an individual claim to arise under
disparate treatment would leave those protected individuals adversely affected
by the test wronged without a remedy.'" Accordingly, all "bottom line" cases
would present instances of individuals clearly suffering the discriminatory im-
"g Ironically, one of the dissenting Justices in Teal advocated the approach taken by the
Teal majority in a prior Supreme Court decision. In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1979), Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated, "it is clear beyond cavil
that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant
regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already propor-
tionately represented in the workforce." Id. at 579 (emphasis the Court's). By allowing the in-
dividual victims of racial discrimination in Teal to successfully invoke the protection of Title VII,
the Teal majority fully appreciates and implements the purpose of the statute as accurately stated
by Justice Rehnquist.
38° Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2532.
"' 102 S. Ct. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also, supra, notes 310-53 and accompa-
nying text.
382
 For a discussion of disparate treatment analysis under Title VII, see supra notes
33-41, 59-73 and accompanying text.
383 Id.
384 An individual would be left without a remedy because once deprived of the disparate
impact theory, it would be necessary for an individual to satisfy the elements of a disparate treat-
ment case set forth in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), discussed supra note
38. The difficulty involved in this approach is illustrated in the Second Circuit's Teal opinion.
645 F.2d 133 (1981). The Teal plaintiffs originally challenged the discriminatory promotion pro-
cedure under both disparate impact and disparate treatment. Id. at 136. The Appeals Court
agreed with the district court's decision to view the Teal case under disparate impact, because of
the difficulty surrounding the proof that plaintiff was a qualified candidate. Proof of qualification
is a critical stage in the establishment of a prima fade case under disparate treatment. Id. at 137.
If the plaintiff was qualified for the job, and failed the promotion test, the plaintiff would have to
prove the written test was not job related in order to maintain its assertion that he is in fact
qualified. Id. The court concluded the question of whether the test is job related is more ap-
propriately resolved through disparate impact analysis. Id.
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pact of an employment practice, but deprived of any relief if the employer's
final hiring or promotion decision reflects a relatively nondiscriminatory bot-
tom line. 385
As some commentators had predicted, the resolution of the bottom line
issue would eventually depend on the outcome of the conflict between two
views of Title VII. 386 One view sees the purpose of Title VII as the protection
of each individual from the discriminatory deprivation of employment oppor-
tunity."' The other view considers the obligation imposed by the statute
satisfied when a reallocation of jobs occurs in favor of a promoted group. 388 In
Connecticut v. Teal, a majority of the Supreme Court found Congress held the
former view when it enacted Title VII. After Teal, the right to equal opportuni-
ty must be preserved even if an individual's protected group as a whole is ade-
quately represented after an entire selection process has been completed.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CONNECTICUT V. TEAL
The consequences of Connecticut v. Teal will affect not only the future of the
bottom line , concept, but also how the purpose of Title VII is viewed. It is
crucial for employers to know that after Teal, they may be forced to alter the
structure of their employee selection procedures. It is just as important for in-
dividuals, whether they be applicants for first time employment or for promo-
tion, that Connecticut v. Teal allows them to invoke the protection of Title VII in
situations where they previously would have had no adequate remedy for
discrimination.
This casenote now examines five specific consequences of the Teal deci-
sion. The first consequence of Teal is the expansion of an individual's ability to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII.
Second, Teal may be viewed as lessening the distinction between the disparate
impact and disparate treatment methods of analysis under Title VII. Third,
Teal's effect upon the bottom line provision of the Uniform Guidelines will be
examined. Next, the Teal decision, arguably, may lead to the abandonment of
employment testing by employers. Finally, the Teal rationale may affect the use
of cumulative selection procedures. It is suggested that through the use of
cumulative selection procedures, it may be possible for employers to continue
using the bottom line concept despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Teal.
The Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut v. Teal expands the ability of
an individual to establish a prima facie case and maintain an action of employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII. Prior to Teal, the majority of federal
'a' This result does not seem consistent with the Congressional intent behind Title VII,
see supra, note 369, and in particular the efforts of the Congress to structure a statute which would
"enable an individual to secure his own rights through the courts." 110 CONG. REC. 13082
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
386 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1193.
"7 Id.
311
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courts abided by the bottom line approach when an individual challenged the
discriminatory operation of a component of a selection procedure, but the en-
tire selection procedure yielded non-discriminatory results. 389 The effect of the
application of the bottom line approach by the courts was to prevent the
establishment of a prima facie case by an individual who was eliminated from
consideration at an isolated stage of the process. 39°
After Teal, an individual may establish a prima facie case under the
statute when a single component of a selection procedure operates as a
discriminatory barrier to the individual's employment opportunity."t Thus,
the ability of an individual to establish a prima facie case will not be deterred
by a favorable representation of the individual's group as a whole at the bottom
line. The establishment of this prima facie case compels an employer to
demonstrate the written test, or other selection criterion challenged, is job
related. 392 This burden is now imposed on the employer even if the employer's
overall process results in no discriminatory impact."' In addition, the Teal
holding precludes the use of favorable bottom line evidence by the employer as
a defense to a Title VII action.'" By allowing the establishment of a prima
facie case in the face of nondiscriminatory bottom line results, the Teal opinion
therefore expands the ability of an individual to bring a Title VII action. Prior
to Teal, such an action could not be maintained in most federal courts."'
389 See supra note 6. See also supra notes 135-86 and accompanying text.
"° Id.
"' See discussion of Connecticut v. Teal, supra notes 259-316.
392 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
393 For a discussion of the employer's burden following the establishment of a prima
facie case, see supra, notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 289-309 and accompanying text.
395 For a vivid illustration of the use of the bottom line concept before, and after Teal, see
Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982) read on rehearing 694 F.2d 876, 30 FEP Cas. 593
(1st Cir. 1982) rev'd en bane 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Costa involved a selection procedure for
police officers in New Bedford, Mass. The plaintiff, a woman, passed a civil service test, physical
exam, and was ranked first on the eligibility list for female applicants. A city, in need of police of-
ficers, would select a new officer from the eligibility list. When the City of New Bedford required
female officers, the City passed over the plaintiff and the second ranked applicant because they
did not satisfy the City's 5 foot, 6 inch minimum height requirement. Two women who placed
third and fourth on the list, and satisfied the height requirement were chosen in New Bedford.
The plaintiff challenged the minimum height requirement under the disparate impact
method of Title VII analysis, 677 F.2d 158, 159. The City defended by pointing to the "bottom
line" which indicated women were hired, therefore, no discrimination had occurred. Id. at 160.
A few months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Teal, the First Circuit ruled the plaintiff
had not suffered discrimination since no adverse impact was suffered by women. Id. Confronted
with the Second Circuit's decisions in Teal, the Costa court chose to ignore Teal and follow the
reasoning of Brown v. New Haven Civil Ser. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979), discussed
supra notes 139-167 and accompanying text. Id. at 161. The Costa court stated, "... we do not
follow the Teal approach. Absent any discriminatory purpose, we see no justification for looking
behind a result that does not reveal a hiring that has a disproportionately adverse impact on the
relevant labor pool." Id. 161-162.
After Teal's rejection of the bottom line approach, the First Circuit granted a petition for
rehearing to examine the effect of the Supreme Court's Teal decision on their prior disposition of
Costa. 694 F.2d 876, 30 FEP Cas. 593 (1st Cir. 1982). In their second Costa opinion, the appeals
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A second consequence of the Teal decision centers on whether the Court's
opinion lessens the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment. The opinion of the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Teal does not result in
a lessening of the distinction between the disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact methods of Title VII analysis. Teal involved a challenge to a written
employment examination. 396 Challenges to such facially neutral employment
practices historically have been reviewed under the disparate impact theory."'
The Teal majority did not depart from this traditional use of disparate impact.
At the outset of its opinion, the majority reviewed the decision of the District
Court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals to classify Teal as a disparate im-
pact case.'" Accordingly, the Court applied the disparate impact standard of
review drawn from Griggs a. Duke Power Co. to the results of the examination ad-
ministered by the employer in Teal. 399 Under this standard, the Court conclud-
ed that the plaintiffs had sufficiently established a prima facie case of a violation
of Title VII."°
Justice Powell in his dissent however, expresses the fear that the majority
has blurred the distinction between the two theories by allowing the individual
plaintiffs to invoke the group oriented theory of disparate impact when, in his
opinion, the group as a whole has suffered no discrimination."' Under
Powell's view of the two theories, individuals wishing to challenge an employ-
ment practice as discriminatory under Teal-like circumstances are limited to
the use of the disparate treatment theOry. 402 Powell and the dissenters believe
the disparate impact theory is only available to plaintiffs when an individual's
protected group has suffered an adverse impact at the bottom line, despite the
court engaged in a detailed review of the Teal case and concluded that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion required a reversal of their previous Costa opinion. Id. The First Circuit stated:
Teal teaches us the proper place to evaluate a Title VII plaintiff's prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination is the point at which the employer's neutral
criterion had a discriminatory effect. The Court's focus must be on the first step in
the employment process that produces an adverse effect on a group protected on
Title VII, not the end result of the employment practice as a whole. When it is
shown an employer's rule disproportionately effects members of a class protected by
Title VII, eliminating them from competition for an employment opportunity, the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.
Id. at 30 FEP Cas. 593, 595.
In May, 1983, however, the First Circuit reheard the Costa cast: a third time sitting en
&inc. The court reinstated its original Costa holding that no discrimination had occurred because
the height policy had not resulted in the exclusion of women, merely the exclusion of the plaintiff.
706 F.2d at 12. As Circuit Judge Bownes stated in his dissent, the Court's holding is irrecon-
cilable with Teal. See Costa, 706 F.2d 1, 14-15 (Bownes, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
397 See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
398 Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2530.
399 Id. at 2531.
404 Id. See also supra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
401 102 S. Ct. at 2536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
402 Id. at 2537 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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presence of a discriminatory component in the procedure. 40" Under this ap-
proach, an individual could not successfully challenge a discriminatory, facial-
ly neutral employment practice when a nondiscriminatory bottom line
existed.'" Thus the individual suffers clear discrimination, but is left without a
means of relief under Title VII.'" It is precisely this unfair result which is
avoided by the Teal majority's decision to allow an individual to maintain a
disparate impact challenge to a criterion which acts as a barrier to employment
opportunity, even in the face of a non-discriminatory bottom line. The majori-
ty of the Court merely applied disparate impact in its traditional way to protect
the individual from barriers which deprive him of employment opportunities in
accordance with the plain language of Title VII. The distinction between
disparate impact and disparate treatment actions was not altered by the Teal
majority. 406
A third consequence of Teal is the effect of the ruling on the Uniform
,Guidelines. The bottom line provision adopted in the Uniform Guidelines is
not invalidated by the Supreme Court's decision in Teal."' The Teal opinion
does not explicitly contradict the wording of the bottom line provision in the
guidelines, nor find the paragraph inconsistent with Title VII.'" Thus, Teal
does not represent an outright rejection of the guidelines. The bottom line pro-
vision is left intact because the Court only interpreted the Uniform Guidelines
as not applicable to the issue contested in Ted.'" The Teal Court reviewed the
403 See supra notes 328-35 and accompanying text.
404 See supra 135-86 and accompanying text.
4° 5 See supra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
406 The Teal majority reaffirmed the distinction between disparate treatment and
disparate impact analysis at the close of its opinion. The Court concluded its opinion by stating:
.. irrespective of the form taken by the discriminatory practice, an employer's treat-
ment of other members of the plaintiff's group can be 'of little comfort to the victims
of discrimination.... Title VII does not permit the victim of a facially
discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other persons
of his or her race or sex have been hired. That answer is no more satisfactory when it
is given to victims of a policy that is facially neutral, but practically discriminatory.
Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment and
against policies that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.. [r]equire-
ments and tests that have a discriminatory impact are merely some of the more, but
also the more pervasive of the 'practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens'.
102 S. Ct. at 2535, (emphasis the Court's).
407 For a discussion of the Uniform Guidelines, see supra notes 119-34 and accompanying
text.
406 Teal, 102 S. Ct. at 2534 n.4. See also supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
409 Id. In the past, the Supreme Court has concluded that Title VII contradicts a provi-
sion of a EEOC guideline provision. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the
Court found that the exclusion of piegnancy related disability from the coverage of the
employer's weekly disability benefits plan was not a violation of Title VII. Id. at 127. Confronted
with an EEOC guideline which explicitly called for the inclusion of pregnancy related disability
in such benefit plans, the Court ruled the contrary conclusion reached by the guidelines was not
"persuasive" and not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII. Id. at 142.
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guidelines in conjunction with their original purpose as stated by the issuing
agencies."° When the guidelines were promulgated in 1978, the agencies ex-
plained that the bottom line provision did not prohibit an individual from pur-
suing a Title VII challenge of a discriminatory selection criterion in the
presence of non-discriminatory bottom line results. 4 " The guidelines were in-
tended only to apply to enforcement actions initiated by one of the government
agencies."' Therefore, the Teal opinion merely clarified the propriety of an
employer using the guidelines to restrict an individual plaintiff's private
challenge of a discriminatory selection criterion in a bottom line situation.
After Teal, the guidelines may not be viewed as an authoritative expression of
statutory interpretation supporting an employer's use of the bottom line
defense in a private action. The Uniform Guidelines' status as a restraint on
government prosecution of employers who maintain non-discriminatory bot-
tom lines in their hiring and promotion schemes remains unchanged. 413
A fourth important impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut
v. Teal is that the ruling may accelerate the increasing abandonment of employ-
ment testing by employers:114
 Prior to Teal, in most federal circuits, an
employer could administer an unvalidated exam to job applicants and act upon
the results as long as the employer achieved a non-discriminatory bottom
line. 415
 Teal allows an individual to establish a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact when a testing procedure has an adverse impact on a protected group,
even if that group as a whole is sufficiently represented at the bottom line. The
majority was both thorough and consistent in its opinion, however, by holding
not only that favorable bottom line evidence does not prevent the establishment
of a prima facie case, but also that evidence of a nondiscriminatory bottom line
may not be used as an affirmative defense by an employer confronted with a
prima facie case. 4 " The only recourse, therefore, for an employer to avoid
liability is to prove the test in question is job related through "validation. "417
Congress subsequently revived the EEOC pregnancy guideline ignored by the Court in
Gilbert by enacting the "Pregnancy Disability Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964" S 701(k) added by P.L. 95-552, effective October 31, 1978. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 97.
4 I° Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct., 2525, 2534 n.12.
*" See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
412 29 C.F.R. 5 1607.4c, the bottom line provision of the Uniform Guidelines, was
republished in its entirety after Teal in the regulations revised as of July 1982.
414 "The Supreme Court decision is expected to have a substantial impact on employer
testing practices." H. ANDERSON & M. LEVIN-EPSTEIN PRIMER OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY, 78 (2d Edition 1982).
712 See supra notes 135-86 and accompanying text.
416 See supra notes 289-304 and accompanying text.
4" The Supreme Court's decision in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), recommended deference to the EEOC guidelines when validation of an employment test
is required after the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case. Id. at 431. The Uniform
Guidelines promulgated by the EEOC and other federal enforcement agencies include 5 5, 29
C.F.R. S 1607.5, which governs validation of employment tests. Basically, the validation process
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The validation of employment testing is governed by Section 1607.5 of the
Uniform Guidelines. 418 That provision contains elaborate standards which
must be satisifed for an employer to defend successfully a test as job related."
Statistics indicate that prior to Teal, many employers decided to abandon
employment testing rather than attempt to satisfy the rigorous validation
standards imposed by the guidelines. 420 The elimination of the bottom line
defense in Teal forces employers who previously could escape the pains of
validation now to validate exams which have a disparate impact on a statutorily
protected group. 42 ' In the aftermath of Teal, employers may wish to reconsider
the benefits of using employment tests when weighed against the potential
costs. 422 Those employers willing to invest the time and money necessary to
determines whether an employment test is actually related to the jobs for which it is used. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN supra note 7, at 66. The validation procedure involves the application of
standards developed by the American Psychological Association which seek to prove job
relatedness through either criterion related validity, content validity, or construct validity. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 66-68; for a thorough treatment of the issue of selection
procedure validation see M. MINER & J. MINER, supra note 83, Chapters 6-20. See also, supra note
56.
418
 Id.
"9 Id.
42D A 1976 BNA survey of 200 companies across the country focused on the use of paper
and pencil tests in the aftermath of Griggs and EEOC activity regarding employment testing. The
results of the survey revealed only 42% of the employers administered pre-employment tests,
compared to 90% of the companies participating in a similar survey in 1963. M. MINER & J.
MINER, supra note 83, at 56.
421 The alternatives to validation are either discontinuing the use of tests, or a finding of
liability under Title VII and the imposition of the various remedies provided for by the statute.
The most costly aspect of a finding of liability under Title VII is the possibility that an employer
will have to pay a substantial amount of money in back pay. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975), the Supreme Court reasoned that the "make whole" purpose of Title
VII requires a presumption of an order for back pay upon a finding of liability under Title VII.
Id. The Court stated, " . given a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied
only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate ihe central statutory purposes of
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy, and making persons whole for the injuries
suffered through past discrimination." Id.
In addition to back pay, 5 706(g) of Title VII authorizes a federal court to exercise its
equitable powers to frame a remedy including an injunction, order of reinstatement, or hiring of
employees, or other affirmative remedy. Furthermore, 5 706(k) enables the prevailing party in a
Title VII action to recover reasonable attorney's fees. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note
7, at 1277-1313 (a comprehensive discussion of remedies under Title VII).
Alternatively, the cost of validation may be a sufficient disincentive for an employer to
engage in employment testing. See, e.g. , B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 103 n.60
("One of these studies involved a sample of 200 bus drivers and cost approximately $400,000").
See also, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring.)
("I fear that a too rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer little choice
save an impossibly expensive and complex validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota
system of employment selection. This of course is far from the intent of Title VII.").
422 See, e.g. , Hunter and Schmidt, Ability Tests: Economic Benefits Versus the Issue of Fairness,
21 INDUSTRIAL REL. 293 (1982) (Benefits of employment testing such as increased productivity
and monetary savings far outweigh the detriments in employment testing).
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validate an employment test, 423
 however, are not precluded from using the test
after Teal, once it is proven to be job related. 424
The fifth and most interesting consequence of the Teal opinion, is the pros-
pect that the Court's holding could be avoided, thus preserving the bottom line
423
 The use of employment tests is specifically recognized by Title VII in S 703(h), see
supra, note 79. The preservation of an employer's right to use an employment test was the subject
of much concern in the Senate debates on the passage of Title VII. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC.
13504 (1964), (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) "Such tests are considered to be legal, there has
never been a denial of that. The only point is that the test that is used for purposes of discrimina-
tion would be declared illegal."; 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum on
Title VII by Senators Clark and Case) "There is no requirement in Title VII that employers
abandon bona fide qualification tests."
424
 In his dissent, Justice Powell also claims that employers may adopt quota hiring in
place of employment testing after Teal. 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2540 (Powell, J., dissenting.) Ironically,
Justice Powell characterizes quota hiring as "an arbitrary method of employment .. itself unfair
to individual applicants whether or not they are members of minority groups." Id. Justice
Powell's concern for the individual in quota hiring seems difficult to reconcile with his tolerance
of individual unfairness under the bottom line theory, which in itself is a quota based concept.
See, e.g., Shoben Probing, supra note 85, at 31 (the bottom line concept is a "surreptitious quota
system"). One of the architects of the bottom line concept, Alfred Blumrosen, apparently con-
siders the bottom line approach quota based. At a workshop of the American Psychological
Association, he criticized the Supreme Court's Teal decision by claiming the ruling will have the
effect of "knocking out affirmative action" and removing employer incentives because "the
numbers game" is no longer applicable. HERRICK & SMITH, EMPLOYMENT LAW NEWSLETTER,
Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 1 (October 1982).
In addition, in terms of Title VII liability, it could be more advisable for an employer to
rely on the results of validated selection techniques rather than random or quota hiring. See M.
MINER & J. MINER, Supra note 83, at 16-17.
Whether there is adverse impact or not, an employer should determine whether any
selection procedure is job related; otherwise, there is little if any justification for us-
ing the procedure. Random selection, frequently advocated by civil rights activists,
may very. well be as effective unvalidated selection procedure. However, both these
approaches involve costs in terms of unnecessary turn-over, low employee produc-
tivity, and other detrimental effects that can be avoided by the use of validated selec-
tion techniques.
Id. at 74.
Justice Powell also expresses concern in the Teal dissent that the use of validated tests in-
stead of voluntary affirmative action adjustments by the employer will actually result in fewer
protected individuals being employed. Teal 102 S. Ct. at 2540 (Powell J., dissenting.) Justice
Powell's reasoning is not unassailable. As two commentators have stated, "minority representa-
tion in overall employment on a level equal to that in the labor market, or even in the applicant
pool, is no assurance that minority employment might not even be higher in the absence of the
`discriminatory' test." Booth and Mackay, supra note 7, at 156-57. In addition, preferential
treatment is not required by Title VII under 703(j). See also 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey) "Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability
and qualifications, not race or religion." Employers are permitted, however, to engage in private
affirmative action under United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Above all, the prospect of greater minority representation under a discriminatory test
coupled with affirmative action than would be achieved through a validated test alone, cannot
offset the injury suffered by protected individuals. The Supreme Court has clearly stated in Inter-
national Bh'd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), "The company's later
changes in its hiring and promotion policies could be of little comfort to the victims of earlier, post
Act discrimination, and could not erase its previous illegal conduct, or its obligation to afford
relief to those who suffered because of it." Id. at 341-42.
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approach. It is possible that employers may avoid the reach of the Teal opinion
by instituting cumulative selection procedures. 425
 In a cumulative selection
procedure, no one component of the selection process must be overcome to re-
main eligible for consideration by the employer. 4 '26 The theory behind the
cumulative system is that an individual will offset a poor performance on an
arguably discriminatory component of the process with a superior performance
on one of the other requirements. 427 Because the Teal opinion focuses on com-
ponents that operate as barriers to employment opportunity, an employer
maintaining a cumulative selection procedure could argue an applicant is not
exposed to any "barriers" in such a system since all applicants experience all
stages of the selection process. 428
 Despite the fact that a component of a
cumulative selection procedure could be shown to act as much like a barrier to
employment opportunity as the pass-fail test hurdle in Teal, an argument
distinguishing Teal might be successful. Thus, the failure of the Teal Court to
define the scope of its opinion could encourage the implementation of
cumulative selection procedures, resulting in the skillful circumvention of Con-
necticut v. Teal.
If necessary, however, the Teal holding could be applied to prevent the
denial of equal employment opportunities that might occur in a cumulative
selection procedure. In a final footnote to his dissent, Justice Powell raises this
possibility of employers choosing to "integrate test results into one overall hir-
ing decision based on that factor and other factors." "9
 The possibility that the
Teal holding may be avoided through the use of cumulative selection pro-
cedures, however, rests on more than a footnote in a dissent.
In Teal, the Supreme Court affirmed in full the decision of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal's Teal opinion. 430
 In that case, the appeals court stated,
"We hold that where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection
process produced disparate results and constituted a pass-fail barrier beyond
which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie
case of disparate impact is established notwithstanding that the entire selection
procedure did not yield disparate results." 431
 The emphasis attached by the
Second Circuit to its bifurcated holding is evident in the Teal opinion. The ap-
peals court dealt at length with the distinction between situations where a test
operates as a pass-fail barrier to employment opportunity for an individual,
and instances when a test is one of several factors aggregated to achieve a
cumulative rating on an applicant. 432
425
 For a discussion of cumulative selection procedures, see supra notes 165-83 and ac-
companying text.
426 id.
427 Id.
428 See supra note 238.
4"
 Connecticut v. Teal 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2540 n.8 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting.).
*" Teal v. State of Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981).
491
	 at 135 (emphasis in original),
432 Id. at 137-38.
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Accordingly, the Second Circuit's Teal opinion endorsed the relevance of
bottom line results when a component of a cumulative procedure is under at-
tack:433 The appeals court advocated the same policy in Kirkland v. New York
State Department of Correctional Services . 434 In that case, the court refused a request
to examine the sub-tests of a cumulatively scored examination. 435 In its Teal
opinion, the court stated that "viewing the overall results of a selection process
is ordinarily a prudent course to pursue." 436
 When a selection procedure con-
tains a single component which acts as a pass-fail barrier, however, the court
discarded the general rule and analyzed the component for disparate impact.
The Second Circuit explicitly approved of the bottom line approach, however,
when a component of a cumulative selection procedure is being challenged,
and the overall results reveal no significant disparate impact. 4"
The Supreme Court's silence regarding the role of the bottom line concept
in cumulative selection,procedures in Teal could be interpreted by employers as
a tacit endorsement of the Second Circuit's acceptance of the bottom line
theory in the context of cumulative selection procedures. 438 Moreover, the Teal
majority's emphasis on the operation of the test in Teal as a "barrier" could be
distinguished. 439 In a case where an individual challenges the disparate impact
of a single component of a cumulative selection procedure, the defendant
employer plausibly could argue that the component by itself did not function as
a barrier to opportunity within the meaning of the Teal opinion. The employer
could demonstrate that the individual was not denied equal employment op-
portunity since he was exposed to every component which combined to pro-
duce a single rating for selection. 44 °
In response to an employer's defense claiming a cumulative selection pro-
cedure is outside the scope of the Teal ruling, it is foreseeable that a plaintiff
challenging the operation of such a procedure could nonetheless employ the
concept of "a barrier to employment opportunity" set forth in Teal. The
distinction between a test functioning as a barrier when it is a mandatory pass-
fail hurdle and not acting as a barrier when used in a cumulative process is not
a clear one. In addition, the Supreme Court's emphasis on the protection of
each individual in Teal could be employed by a plaintiff challenging a compo-
43 ' Id. See also, supra note 328.
4" 520 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1975). See also, supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
4" Id.
4" Teal, 645 F.2d at 138.
,437
4" The issue of the bottom line in cumulative selection procedures was briefed for the
Supreme Court in Teal. See Brief for Respondents at 21; Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal
Employment Advisory Council and International Personnel Management Association in support
of the Petitioners at 16-21; Brief Amid Curiae of the National League of Cities and National
Public Employer:Labor Relations Assoc. in Support of Petitioners at 20-29; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 14, reprinted in BNA's LAW REPRINTS, supra note 7.
4" See, e.g., Teal, 645 F.2d at 137-38.
44° Id. See also, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
873, 894-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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nent of a cumulative selection procedure. A plaintiff could argue that despite
the structure of a cumulative selection process, an individual component of the
process acted as a discriminatory barrier to employment opportunity. If a
plaintiff could prove the component did in fact have the effect of a barrier, then
his argument would be justified under the Teal rationale.
A testing component of a cumulative selection procedure logically could
be shown to act as an exclusionary barrier to employment opportunity. In
Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 441
 Judge Newman stated that a protected
individual could score so low on a culturally biased test, that it would be
numerically impossible for that individual to compensate for his poor perform-
ance by achieving a superior rating on other components of a multipart selec-
tion process."' In this type of situation, the test would effectively operate as the
type of barrier to opportunity outlined in Teal. Another possible scenario is the
prospect of a single discriminatory question on a written test which has an
adverse effect on members of a group protected under Title VII. If an in-
dividual member of this group fails to accumulate the requisite aggregate
rating at the end of the total multi-part process by one point, the effect of the
test would be a barrier to employment opportunity."'
If necessary, therefore, the prohibitive language of Teal could be applied
in these situations involving cumulative selection procedures. It could be
argued that the paramount concern expressed by the Supreme Court in Teal is
the protection of each individual under Title VII. The concern expressed by
the Court for the plight of the individual could be cited as a justification for the
penetration of even a cumulative selection procedure to examine the disparate
impact of a single component. Thus, although the language of Teal appears to
be limited to situations where a single component is used as a preliminary pass-
fail barrier in a selection procedure, courts should apply the Teal rationale to
cases involving cumulative, or multi-part selection procedures as wel1. 444 Until
such time as the scope of Teal is defined through future litigation, however, it
441 474 F. Supp. 1256 (ID. Conn. 1979), discussed supra notes 139-64 and accompanying
442 Brown, 474 F. Supp. at 1262.
443 Id.
444
 Courts could apply a broad interpretation to the Supreme Court's holding in Teal
which states, "we hold that the bottom line does not preclude respondent-employee from
establishing a prima facie case, nor does it provide petitioner-employer with a defense to such a
case," Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2529, as a general prohibition on the use of the bot-
tom line concept. Such a general interpretation was adopted by a member of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Costa v, Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 30 FEP Cas. 593 (1982) discussed supra note 395.
When confronted with an attempt to distinguish Teal in that case because Costa involved a sex-
specific hiring procedure, Circuit Judge Campbell refused to dilute the scope of the Supreme
Court's holding in Teal. Id. at 8 (Campbell, Circuit Judge, concurring). In a separate opinion
concurring with the First Circuit's decision to follow Teal in Costa, he stated, "When the
Supreme Court decides a case, I think we must ascribe a certain generality to its opinion: the
present issue seems to be subsumed in principle, if not in every respect, by the language and
holding in Teal. Accordingly, I think we must affirm the district Court." Id.
text.
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would be rational for an employer to implement a cumulative selection pro-
cedure in an attempt to preserve the viability of the bottom line concept.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut v. Teal clarified several
critical issues in employment discrimination law. Above all else, the decision
reflects the Supreme Court's view of the purpose of Title VII. That purpose is
the preservation of equal employment opportunities for each individual
covered by the statute. In the process of reinforcing this primary purpose of
Title VII, Teal rejects the bottom line concept by finding the disparate impact
theory is not confined in its application only to the end results of a selection
process. The Court refused to accept bottom line evidence in the form of appli-
cant flow statistics as a justification for the obvious discrimination against some
protected individuals at an intermediate stage of the selection process. Teal will
no doubt cause the alteration of selection procedures in which employment ex-
aminations may act as barriers to the employment opportunities of individuals.
Whether the Teal opinion is definitive enough to apply to cumulative selection
procedures remains to be discovered through litigation. Teal may have
answered some questions regarding the purpose of Title VII, the nature of
disparate impact analysis, and the use of employment tests. But it is also pos-
sible that the Court's opinion left just enough ambiguity to allow its holding to
be avoided through a rejuvenated bottom line defense.
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